The Strategy of the Islamic State: Instrumental and Organizational Developments in Relation to the Strategy of Al Qaeda by Al-Kahwati, Ashi
Master Thesis 
Lund University 
Faculty of  Political Science 
The Strategy of  the Islamic State  
Instrumental and Organizational Developments in Relation to 
the Strategy of  Al Qaeda 
Ashi Al-Kahwati 
January 2018 
Course: STVM25 
Supervisor: Douglas Brommesson 
  
Abstract 
Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are two of  the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world, 
whose terror campaigns have changed the nature of  global jihadi terrorism in fundamental ways. The 
purpose of  this thesis is to study the strategy of  the Islamic State in relation to the strategy of  Al 
Qaeda, with Martha Crenshaw’s Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives. These perspectives 
provide different explanations on the behavior of  terrorist organizations: while the Instrumental 
focuses on the intentions of  terror groups, the Organizational Perspective focuses on the internal 
dynamics between members, and organizational survival.  
Furthermore, this thesis is conducted through a comparative case study, in which different aspects of  
Al Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s strategies are examined. Emphasis is on studying the intentions and 
capabilities of  each group by examining the ideology, goals, warfare, tactics, propaganda, recruitment, 
organization, and resources. Two of  the main results are that one needs to understand Al Qaeda in 
order to understand the strategy of  the Islamic State, and that the Instrumental and Organizational 
Perspectives complement each other: while the Instrumental Perspective explains the rationale behind 
the organization’s strategy, the Organizational Perspective offers explanations of  how the organization 
is shaped by its members.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Background 
The terror organizations Al Qaeda and the Islamic State are undoubtedly the two largest ‘brands’ of  
global insurgent terrorism, i.e., non-state actors that practice global terrorism, a phenomenon which has 
evolved through establishments of  new strategies, ideas and methods. Until quite recently, Al Qaeda 
was considered the most dangerous and uncompromising terror organization, with 9/11 being their 
signature mark as the most lethal and innovative terror attack in modern history. In the summer of  
2014, the Islamic State got the attention of  world leaders and media. Originally known as Al Qaeda in 
Iraq, the group rebranded themselves to the Islamic State of  Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) after capturing 
large areas of  land in both Syria and Iraq, and declaring it a caliphate. Moreover, the terrorism of  the 
Islamic State was of  another kind: the publicly staged beheadings, slavery, crucifixions and success in 
capturing territory left many confused. Where did this group come from? How had they conquered so 
much land? Why this kind of  brutality? Although initially successful, in the fall of  2017, the Islamic 
State had lost all their strategically important territory (BBC 2017).    
Despite losing territory, the future of  the Islamic State is uncertain, as scholar Anthony Cordesman 
emphasizes: “Ending ISIS physical caliphate will not end ISIS or the broader threat of  terrorism and 
Islamist extremism” (Cordesman 2017: 2). This assertion regarding the broader threat of  Islamist 
terrorism also relates to the resurgence of  Al Qaeda in various parts of  the world, e.g., Afghanistan and 
North Africa (Hoffman 2017: 14). In other words: neither Al Qaeda nor the Islamic State are likely to 
decline or disappear, but rather develop, and the future of  terrorism is still very much uncertain.  
However, in order to understand the future of  terrorism in relation to organizations such as Al Qaeda 
and the Islamic State, knowledge about their past and present terrorist strategies is required. According 
to Peter Neumann and M.L.R. Smith of  King’s College, “the only scholar to have explored terrorism as 
a strategy is Martha Crenshaw, whose work continues to be essential in developing a comprehensive 
understanding of  the phenomenon” (Neumann & Smith 2008: 356-357). One strength in the theories 
of  Crenshaw lies in the fact that she asserts rationality behind the action of  terrorist organizations: 
despite brutality and lethality, there is carefully strategic planning. In other words, it would be unwise to 
view the actions of  either Al Qaeda or the Islamic State as irrationality or as a ‘death loving cult’. For 
Crenshaw, it is essential to base predictions of  future terrorism on theories that explain past patterns 
(Crenshaw 2011: 122). This is also the aim with this thesis: to understand the strategy of  the Islamic 
State with the help of  her theoretical framework. Moreover, since this group used to be an affiliate of  
Al Qaeda, the strategy of  Al Qaeda should also be examined to understand where the Islamic State 
came from, and why they differ with regards to their strategy.  
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1.2. Purpose of  the Study 
The purpose of  this study is to examine the development of  the strategy of  the Islamic State, especially 
how it has been developed in relation to the strategy of  Al Qaeda. To study this, two main theories are 
used: the Instrumental and the Organizational Perspectives, that cover different aspects of  terror 
organizations’ strategic development. An operationalization of  terrorist strategies is created in order to 
focus on the most important aspects of  the respective strategies of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.  
1.3. Research Questions 
The following research question is used:  
How can the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives of terrorism explain the development of the 
strategy of the Islamic State in relation to Al Qaeda? 
1.4. Delimitations  
This study is limited to the strategic level of  the terrorist organizations Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Therefore, certain details that belong to the tactical and operational levels will not be included. The 
strategic level includes things that affect the whole organization, and shape the direction in which it is 
moving. Issues that are related to a single operation, attack, or to single members in the organization are 
therefore not relevant. For example, it is relevant to look at the overall propaganda strategy (i.e., what 
channels are used, what the broad themes are), but not on the details of  specific instances.  
Furthermore, since the aim of  the study is to examine how the strategy of  the Islamic State has 
developed in relation to Al Qaeda, the focus will mainly be on the Islamic State and not on Al Qaeda. 
While their strategy is included in the data and analysis, the aim of  this study is not to explain the 
strategy of  Al Qaeda, nor to explain what effects the Islamic State has had on the development of  Al 
Qaeda’s strategy. 
Additionally, this thesis focuses on terrorist strategy, not counter-terrorist strategy. Therefore, the 
actions of  government, and ways to combat terrorism, are not included in the scope of  this thesis. 
While certain factors including government actions are touched upon, e.g., when terrorist organizations 
change their strategies as a result of  what the government does, this thesis will not go into detail 
regarding what governments can do to prevent or fight against terrorism.  
1.5. Gaps and Contribution To Knowledge Development 
This thesis contributes to the field of  terrorism research in two main ways: by applying Martha 
Crenshaw’s theoretical framework to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, and by making a structured analysis 
of  the overall strategies of  the two terrorist groups. In the current state of  terrorism research, there are 
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gaps when it comes to both these things. While Martha Crenshaw’s Instrumental and Organizational 
Perspectives have been studied, they have not yet been used to examine the strategies of  Al Qaeda and 
the Islamic State in a comprehensive way.  
When it comes to comparisons between the strategies of  Al Qaeda and the Islamic State there are 
works that examine the differences, but the majority of  these works analyze a particular aspect of  the 
strategy in depth, such as ideology or propaganda. In this thesis, the strategies are compared in a very 
structured and holistic way, providing an explanation of  the overall strategy. Moreover, explanations of  
why and how these differences between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda might have occurred, are also 
provided.  
In other words, this thesis is relevant both within the field of  Political Science as well as Terrorism 
Research. On the one hand, this thesis aims to deal with the issue of  violence perpetrated by non-state 
actors that affects whole societies, and the international community in relation to security policies. On 
the other hand, it contributes to the field of  Terrorism Research by providing a comprehensive analysis 
on the rationale and internal group dynamics behind terrorist organizations. 
1.6. Previous Research 
1.6.1. Terrorism 
The field of  terrorism studies is very broad and interdisciplinary, with aspects relating to other areas 
such as political science, international relations, history, military science, and communications, just to 
name a few. McAllister and Schmid argues that the complexity of  terrorism with its different forms and 
manifestations distinguishes it from other political phenomena (McAllister & Schmid 2011: 202). This 
also speaks to the theories regarding terrorism: on the one hand, general enough to deal with wide 
spectra of  different terrorism, and on the other, narrow enough to analyze a particular feature of  
terrorism. 
Since the aim of  this thesis is to study the strategy of  the Islamic State in relation to Al Qaeda’s strategy 
from Crenshaw's Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives, the focus is on non-state terrorism 
with an institutional/organizational level of  analysis. An organizational level of  analysis deals with the 
dynamics within a terrorist group and their goals, such as the articulation of  strategies, mobilization of  
resources and recruitment of  members, among other things (McAllister & Schmid 2011: 226). Besides 
the work of  Crenshaw, scholars such as David Rapoport, Bruce Hoffman, Mark Juergensmayer, 
Magnus Ranstorp, and Walter Laqueur have contributed with analysis to explaining non-state terrorism.  
Rapoport offers, for instance, a broad historical classification with his Wave theory (McAllister & Schmid 
2011: 228-230). These historical waves range over a century, from the early Russian anarchists to today’s 
Islamist terrorist. According to Rapoport, each wave had its own particular kind of  terrorist 
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organization with a special characteristic of  strategies and targets (McAllister & Schmid 2011: 229). The 
first wave is exemplified with the Russian anarchists who as a consequence of  slow or failed reforms, 
resorted to terrorism by assassinating elites and robbing banks (McAllister & Schmid 2011: 230). 
Rapoport contrasts this with his fourth and last last wave which is characterized by religiously 
motivated violence, the rise of  Islamist terrorism and suicide terrorism as their ‘modus operandi’. 
Religiously motivated political violence on the other hand, particularly the rise of  Islamist terrorism, is 
characterized by its most catastrophic strategy: suicide terrorism. Rapoport traces three events which 
has come to shape the fourth wave: Shia radicalism inspired by the Iranian revolution in 1979, the 
success of  Sunni militants in Afghanistan in 1980, and the arrival of  a new Islamic Century: the al-hijra 
calendar, thus adding a ‘millenarian aspect’ within both Shia and Sunni radicalism.  
The debate regarding the rise of  religious elements in relation to insurgency terror on an institutional 
level can be divided into two large strands of  thought within terrorism studies (McAllister & Schmidt 
2011:231). One the one hand, there are those who believe that the combination of  religious and 
political violence changes the nature of  terrorism from an old kind of  terrorism to a new, more lethal 
and fanatical one. On the other hand, some scholars see religion as a “collective action solution” for the 
terror organizations who still seek to change the political status quo. Ranstorp views religious terror as 
a form of  warfare, although also acknowledging some factors that differentiates the terrorism with 
religious elements from more conventional terrorism (McAllister & Schmid 2007: 231). One such is the 
idea of  a particular juncture in history which religious radicals feel that they are a part of. The other is 
the belief  of  ‘worldly’ events as a struggle between good and evil, making religious radicals more 
uncompromising in their terrorism. Hoffman also focuses on religiously motivated terrorism as a part 
of  a wider comparative analysis on today’s terrorism (Hoffman 2006). In his work Hoffman draws 
distinctions based on typologies of  terrorism such as ethno-nationalist like Irgun, EOKA, FNL and 
religious terrorism such as Jewish terrorism, Islamic groups and American Christian white supremacists 
(Hoffman 2006: 61-62, 82). With regards to religious terrorism, Hoffman argues that the notion of  
religiously motivated violence is driven by terrorists as something holy. The belief  in terrorist violence 
as something sacramental would also be the reason as to why the lethality in terror attacks have 
escalated (Hoffman 2006:88-89).  
On the other side of  the spectrum of  Old vs. New terrorism is Mark Juergensmayer who emphasizes 
that the new kinds of  terrorists perceive the struggle between themselves and their adversaries as a 
cosmic struggle, eventually resulting in a cosmic war (McAllister & Schmid 2011: 232). Juergensmayer 
argues that this idea is driven by two trends regarding religious violence: a tendency toward mass-
casualties, and a lack of  a grand strategy in the use of  violence. Terrorism in this regard is viewed as a 
drama playing to three audiences: the victims, the in-groups, and a wider audience. A lack of  strategy 
and political agenda with regards to new kinds of  terrorism is also something Laqueur emphasizes: the 
new kind of  terrorist motivations and tactics are signified by rage and fanaticism (1999: 81-82, 274). 
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Furthermore, this aggression goes hand in hand with the increasing lethality of  terrorism, further 
coinciding with increased opportunity for obtaining, and using weapons of  mass destruction (WMDs). 
With regards to the debate on Old vs. New terrorism, Crenshaw herself  argues that the attributes of  
the supposedly new terrorism cannot be identified without knowing the features of  the old terrorism 
(Crenshaw 2011: 53-54). Moreover, in order to fully understand terrorist behavior, comparisons must 
also take the historical context into consideration. Only through fact-based comparisons regarding the 
strategies of  terrorist organizations can evaluations of  the changing nature of  terrorism be made, for 
instance, by looking at goals, methods, organizational structure, and resources of  the groups practicing 
terrorism. In this regard, resources and opportunities must be taken into account, as much as changes 
in doctrine and ideology. According to Crenshaw, differences among groups, and in patterns do exist, 
but many of  these shifts are a consequence of  changing environments and other structures of  
opportunity (Crenshaw 2011: 65). 
Since two terrorist organizations with religious imperatives were chosen for this thesis, the theories of  
Juergensmayer or Lacquer could have been used. However, their theories view terrorism through a 
longer historical perspective. Since these theories are based on different kinds typologies of  terrorism 
and distinctions between Old vs. New kinds of  terrorism, an analysis of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda 
from the perspective of  Rapoport would have benefitted from being either based on a longer time 
frame or through a comparison of  different kinds of  terror organizations. However, since both Al 
Qaeda and The Islamic State where founded during the Fourth Wave, a historical comparison becomes 
less suitable, why neither the Wave theory or Old vs. New Terrorism theories is fitting for this research.  
Since the aim is to study the overall strategy of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, this makes theories of  
external goals and internal groups dynamics more beneficial to use, such as the Instrumental and 
Organizational Perspectives. The Instrumental Perspective allows for the study of  collective action 
solutions of  terrorist organizations, i.e., their goals and preferences, while the Organizational 
Perspective is useful with its focus on the internal group dynamics in relation to organizational survival.  
1.6.2. Empirical Research on Al Qaeda and the Islamic State  
Besides theories of  terrorism, there is also a substantial amount of  empirical research on terrorism. 
This is in particular true for organizations such as Al Qaeda, and in recent years, also the Islamic State. 
For example, many comparisons between the two groups have been made. Fawas Gerges have, for 
instance, written extensively on both Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, particularly with regards to their 
ideology and historical development. In the The Far Enemy: How Jihad went global, Gerges focus on 
fractions within the larger jihadist movement pre-9/11, and Al Qaeda’s shift in their enemy picture 
(Gerges 2009). In ISIS: A history, the focus is on the historical development of  the Islamic State, and 
their historical evolution (Gerges 2016). Daniel Byman offers perhaps the most comprehensive 
comparison between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in his Al Qaeda, the Islamic State and the global jihadist 
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movement: What everyone needs to know (2015). Most weight is however on Al Qaeda, with a focus on their 
ideas and influence in relation to their fundamentalist roots and overall organizational development. 
With his The ISIS apocalypse: The history, strategy and doomsday vision of  the Islamic State, Will McCants offers 
a compelling book about the ideological roots of  the Islamic State (2015). 
Although these authors provide important knowledge about Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and some 
differences between them, there is a theoretical gap in explaining how and why these differences have 
occurred. In this regard, I believe an analysis with a combination of  Crenshaw’s Instrumental and 
Organizational Perspectives can provide a substantial contribution. 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2. Theoretical Framework 
2.1. Terrorism: Background and Definitions 
According to Crenshaw, there is no agreed definition of  what terrorism is, because of  problems with 
reaching a “neutral” definition (Crenshaw 2011: 2-5). The inability to reach empirical rather than 
normative definitions have also led to other consequences, such as defining terrorist organizations and 
differentiating terrorism from other forms of  violence. For instance, the term terrorism applies to 
organizations using terrorist violence, but has also been used a way of  delegitimizing the political 
agency of  opponents by a regime. The issue of  state-sponsored terrorism is also difficult to explain 
since states usually have more means to exercise their power (Crenshaw 2011: 4). Another dilemma is 
the context in which terrorism takes place, and the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants. For instance, civil wars or insurgencies mobilize large numbers of  people within sectarian 
fault lines. In such settings, terrorist acts aimed at the power of  the state can also target local 
communities of  another faith or ethnicity. According to Crenshaw, one way of  addressing the problem 
of  what constitutes terrorist violence would be to look at both context and intent. One example of  this 
would be to look at the purpose of  creating a psychological effect in a spectating audience, rather than 
just destroying assets of  military values. Another would be to see how this kind of  violence takes place 
systematically with similar actions.  
In order to study the causes and process of  terrorism, Crenshaw has developed a conceptual 
framework which is based on three levels of  analysis (Crenshaw 2011: 5): 
• the individual,  
• the group and its strategy, and 
• environmental conditions 
Some of  these aspects, like the last point, are difficult to measure. Other perspectives can benefit from 
being coupled in an analysis since terrorism is usually a product of  several aspects, e.g., as an act of  
strategic logic as well as a way of  maintaining organizational coherence. In the next section, a short 
introduction to Crenshaw’s own definition of  terrorism is given. 
2.1.1. Crenshaw’s Definition of  Terrorism 
In 1972 Crenshaw proposed a concept of  terrorism which grew out of  her research of  the Algerian 
terrorist organization Front de Libération National (FLN): “Terrorism is a form of  violence that is 
primarily designed to influence an audience. Its execution depends on concealment, surprise, stealth, 
conspiracy and deception. Terrorism is not spontaneous, nor does it involve mass participation. The act 
itself  communicate a future to people who identify with the victims. The choice of  time, place, and 
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victim is meant to shock, frighten, excite, or outrage. Psychological impact is central to both the 
aspirations of  its uses and its effectiveness. It is an asset to those who challenge authority, in part 
because it maximizes effect while minimizing effort. Its inherent transgressiveness makes it attractive to 
those out of  power, who see in disorder the path to future gain and who often wish to do away with 
the norms they violate” (Crenshaw 2011:2). 
Regardless of  ideology or political objective, Crenshaw argues that actors who use terrorism, do it 
because of  five basic and interrelated reasons (Crenshaw 2011: 9). These are: 
1. Setting the political agenda  
2. Undermining authority 
3. Provoking overreaction from the government or from the population that is targeted  
4. Mobilizing popular support both home and abroad  
5. Coercing compliance  
2.2. The Instrumental Perspective  
In this section, the Instrumental Perspective is explained. Below is summary of  this perspective.  
Table 1: The Instrumental Perspective (Crenshaw 1988: 27) 
The most fundamental notion within the Instrumental Perspective is that terrorism represents a strategic 
choice. Violence is thus regarded as intentional and as a means to a political end (Crenshaw 1988: 13). 
Moreover, the group using terrorism is assumed to demonstrate a collective rationality based on their 
values: violence is chosen from a variation of  other options, and through a cost-benefit calculation 
(Crenshaw 1988: 14). The primary reason for choosing terrorism is because of  efficacy in which action 
is assumed to be valuable, for instance in relation to a high probability of  success, or when the status 
quo is deemed intolerable (Crenshaw 1988: 14). In this regard, the resort to terrorism is best 
The Instrumental Perspective
1. The act of  terrorism represents a strategic choice.
2. The organization using terrorism acts as a unit, on the basis of  collective values.
3. The means of  terrorism are logically related to ends and resources; surprise compensates for weakness.
4. The purpose of  terrorism is to bring about a change in an actor’s environment. 
5. The pattern of  terrorism follows an action-reaction process; terrorism responds to what the government 
does. 
6. Increasing the cost of  terrorism makes it less likely; decreasing the cost or increasing reward makes it 
more likely. 
7. Terrorism fails when its practitioners do not obtain their stated political objectives. 
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understood as a learning process: through experience, dissidents gain information about the potential 
consequences of  their actions, or of  others, communicated to them via news media (Crenshaw 2011: 
113). 
According to Crenshaw, it is important to understand that the extremist groups respond to either 
opportunities or threats in which they “may act out of  anticipation of  reward or out of  
desperation” (Crenshaw 1988: 14). Since terrorism is a strategy of  surprise, the instrumental 
perspective is paramount in order to understand the nature of  surprise attacks. In this regard, the 
means of  terrorism logically relates to their ends and resources: surprise attacks are deemed necessary 
in order to compensate for conditions of  weakness as well as destructive capabilities (Crenshaw 1988: 
14). According to Crenshaw, there are several strategic conditions that promote surprise attacks, which 
are “determined by perceptions of  incentive and opportunities” (Crenshaw 1988: 14). Thus, a terror 
organization might not operationalize their intentions into action, unless the right moment presents 
itself. Moreover, these moments of  opportunities and incentives often relate to time constraints or to 
technical and doctrinal innovations.  
One such opportunity for the terrorists to strike is when the power ratio between the government and 
the terror organization is at the side of  the terrorists (Crenshaw 1988: 15, 2011: 113-117). The regime 
may prove to be weak or fragile to protect its citizens. This can in turn be a consequence of  
circumstances such as overextended resources and/or insufficient security (Crenshaw 2011: 115). 
According to Crenshaw, terrorists who usually are inpatient for action will thus strike: winning cheaply 
and quickly will, for instance, give the terror organization propaganda gains in showing the weakness of  
governments (Crenshaw 1988: 14).  
Another opportunity for terrorists to surprise is through obtaining new kinds of  resources that relate to 
financial means and technological developments (Crenshaw 2011: 115-116). Funding is therefore 
fundamental for support of  full-time activists, weapon purchases, transportation, and logistics. In 
addition, surprise can also be achieved through technical or doctrinal innovation (Crenshaw 1988:15). 
One such example of  a doctrinal innovation has been the shift from hijackings and kidnappings to 
massive and indiscriminate bombings. 
Strategic weakness of  terror organizations might however also result in surprise attacks (Crenshaw 
1988: 15). In this regard, terrorist organizations strike as a response to the actions of  governments. An 
organization might thus attack as a way of  preventing worsening conditions for the terrorists. This also 
explains the escalation of  violence in terrorism in which the terrorists engage in a “process of  constant 
adaption to the strategic environment” (Crenshaw 1988:16).  
However, according to Crenshaw, few organizations attain their long time goals, something which 
makes terrorism a failure as a strategic method. The only reason that it continues is because of  the 
immediate success that terrorists gain from publicity and recognition.  
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The Instrumental Perspective is advantageous with its focus on the goals, intentions and preferences of  
terror groups (Crenshaw 1988:14-16, 2011:112). This is fundamental in order to understand the 
motivations of  terrorist violence: the means used by terrorist organizations must logically relate to their 
ends. Crenshaw emphasizes the symbolic connection between the targets of  terrorism, and the 
ideological beliefs of  the terror group. Moreover, the predictability and interpretability of  terror acts are 
dependent on this connection between target and perpetrator (Crenshaw 1988: 15). 
2.3. The Organizational Perspective 
In this section, the organizational perspective is explained. Below is a summary of  this perspective. 
Table 2: The Organizational Perspective (Crenshaw 1988: 27) 
A key assumption in the organizational perspective is that the “fundamental purpose of  any political 
organization is to maintain itself ”, i.e. survival is the top priority for an organization.  
From an organizational perspective, the act of  terrorism is the result of  group dynamics, leadership and 
incentives, and the individual members’ motives. (Crenshaw 1988: 19-24). Likewise, organizational 
stability and survival are dependent on how the leaders manage dissidents within the group. 
The most important function leaders have is to “enhance and promote the organization,” since the 
political goals and success of  the organization is tied to the leaders and their personal ambitions 
(Crenshaw 1988: 19). However, in order to survive, the organization must provide incentives for its 
members. This can however be rather complicated, since people join terror organizations for different 
reasons, not just ideological: personal needs are considered as important as ideological ones. The 
leaders of  the organization must thus provide both real incentives and fantasies, such as comradeship, 
social status, material needs, or just excitement. According to Crenshaw, radicals who join a militant 
organization may under specific circumstances perceive their membership as a “valued social 
relationship” in which winning the admiration of  family and friends is an important incentive 
The Organizational Perspective
1. The act of  terrorism is the outcome of  internal group dynamics.
2. Individual members of  an organization disagree over ends and means.
3. The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives leaders provide for followers and competition with 
rivals.
4. The motivation for participation in terrorism include personal needs as much as ideological goals.
5. Terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, and unpredictable. 
6. External pressure may strengthen group cohesion; rewards may create incentives to leave the group.
7. Terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates; achieving long-term goals may not be desirable. 
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(Crenshaw 1988: 20). Furthermore, these people may truly believe that they are continuing a historic 
struggle with their violent actions.  
Since the top priority for an organization is survival, leaders might change the goals of  the 
organization, which can cause some terrorist actions to seem inconsistent, erratic and unpredictable 
(Crenshaw 1988: 20-21, 27). In this regard, a chance for action might benefit the organization, since 
activity is regarded as vital for the continuing existence for the organization. According to Crenshaw, 
this way of  ensuring organizational survival is called “operationalizing the ideology” (Crenshaw 1988: 
20).  
According to Crenshaw, the stability of  an organization and the achievement of  goals depends on the 
motivation of  the organization (Crenshaw 1988: 20). In this regard, James Q. Wilson’s theory about two 
different categories of  political purpose is used: either single specific, or redemptive oriented organizations 
(Crenshaw 1988: 20). Organizations with a single-specific objective are, as the name suggests, narrowly 
focused and oriented towards one specific goal (Crenshaw 1988:20). They are common but short lived, 
and often characterized as a protest-movement or revolution. Wilson distinguishes the ideological 
incentives based on beliefs that establish rejections of  the current political situations, and with a 
promise to replace the status quo. Redemptive groups, on the other hand, are characterized by their 
effort to change the lives of  their members, with focus on self-sacrifice, high morality, and conversion. 
Moreover, these groups can be manifested both as religious groups and as terrorist organizations. In 
addition to wanting to change the status quo, the motivation for terrorism in these groups is to go 
beyond reality: the violence is seen as personal and as a way to salvation. However, because of  their 
extreme destructiveness and desperate risk-taking, these groups seldom succeed in achieving their goals. 
In these types of  organizations self-maintenance usually tends to ‘replace’ political purposes: group 
solidarity is substituted for political goals (Crenshaw 1988: 21).  
Furthermore, organizational survival is also tied to external pressure, in which the group may either 
become strengthened or disintegrate. Here, Crenshaw emphasizes Albert O. Hirschman’s economic 
theory of  organizational importance, in which two aspects are emphasized: 1) organizations are more 
sensitive to its members than to government policy, and 2) organizations behave differently in 
competitive than in non-competitive environments, and rivalry happens more frequently when there are 
similar political objectives (Crenshaw 1988: 22).  
In this regard, dissatisfied members of  an organization usually have two choices: exit (i.e., to leave the 
organization), or voice (i.e., to persuade the group to follow another direction) (Crenshaw 1988: 22-23). 
Exit usually take place when a member has failed to exercise its ‘voice.’ This usually happens when 
some members become impatient by the moderates in a group, and wish to escalate the violence. 
Moreover, there are two types of  exit: to join another rival group that appears to be more satisfactory, 
or to “splint,” i.e., to create a new group (Crenshaw 1988: 22). 
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Leaders of  an organization can only resist the demands for change if  the possibilities for exit are nil. 
Moreover, leaders can avoid exit and voice by “soliciting” the loyalty of  members, for instance through 
ideological indoctrination (Crenshaw 1988: 23). However, the existence of  a strong loyalty can also 
become a problem, since it can make it difficult to change the ‘ideological’ incentives when necessary, 
for instance in relation to changing conditions (in relation to operationalization of  ideology). As 
mentioned, this can in turn threaten the organizational survival.  
Although Crenshaw emphasizes that no group can resist the outcome of  either exit or voice in the long 
run, dissatisfied or disappointed fighters can respond by escalating the violence as a means of  ‘saving’ 
the organization (Crenshaw 1988: 23). In this regard, the escalation of  violence can also be understood 
as a way of  attracting new recruits. 
However, according to Crenshaw, preventing exit or voice will eventually lead to a disintegration of  the 
organization. As mentioned, this could be a response to too large changes in incentives, which further 
makes long term goals undesirable. In this regard, the only way to save the organization would be 
through some kind of  innovation (Crenshaw 1988: 24).  
2.4. Instrumental and Organizational Approaches: Motivation 
Although the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives are two different explanations of  the 
behavior of  terror groups, that each on its own provides a comprehensive analysis of  terrorism, a 
combination of  the two theories allows for studying terrorist organizations in a more multifaceted way. 
The Instrumental Perspective allows for studying how the preferences of  terrorist organizations are 
decided, while the Organizational Perspective looks at circumstances, such as incentive structures 
within the organization, and competition among different organizations. Since my aim is to study the 
strategy of  the Islamic State in relation to Al Qaeda’s strategy, both the Instrumental and 
Organizational Perspective are useful in understanding the rationale of  the strategy within the 
organization, as well as the relationship among groups. Thus, in combination, the Instrumental and 
Organizational Perspectives explains “the process of  terrorism” (Crenshaw 1988: 27). Below, a 
summarized comparison of  the two perspectives (taken from Martha Crenshaw) is presented 
(Crenshaw 1988: 27).  
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Table 3: Comparison of the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives (Crenshaw 1988: 27) 
The Instrumental Perspective The Organizational Perspective
1. The act of  terrorism represents a strategic 
choice.
1. The act of  terrorism is the outcome of  internal 
group dynamics.
2. The organization using terrorism acts as a unit, 
on the basis of  collective values.
2. Individual members of  an organization disagree 
over ends and means.
3. The means of  terrorism are logically related to 
ends and resources; surprise compensates for 
weakness.
3. The resort to terrorism reflects the incentives 
leaders provide for followers and competition with 
rivals.
4. The purpose of  terrorism is to bring about a 
change in an actor’s environment. 
4. The motivation for participation in terrorism 
include personal needs as much as ideological 
goals.
5. The pattern of  terrorism follows an action-
reaction process; terrorism responds to what the 
government does. 
5. Terrorist actions often appear inconsistent, erratic, 
and unpredictable. 
6. Increasing the cost of  terrorism makes it less 
likely; decreasing the cost or increasing reward 
makes it more likely. 
6. External pressure may strengthen group cohesion; 
rewards may create incentives to leave the group.
7. Terrorism fails when its practitioners do not 
obtain their stated political objectives. 
7. Terrorism fails when the organization disintegrates; 
achieving long-term goals may not be desirable. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Research Approach 
The purpose of  this study is to explain how the strategy of  the Islamic State has developed, especially 
in relation to Al Qaeda. When it comes to analyzing strategies and organizations, it is hard to quantify 
different parts, why a qualitative approach is used. Since deep, qualitative information is required, a 
comparative case study approach is used.  
3.1.1. Qualitative Research  
In qualitative research, the focus is on gathering “data and information in-depth” (Burnham et al 2008: 
40). This can be either achieved by studying single or multiple cases. The in-depth focus offers both 
detailed studies as well as a holistic understanding of  how some processes and relationships are 
connected within social settings (Denscombe 2010: 53). However, the significance of  in-depth 
knowledge comes at the expense of  making generalizations about the phenomenon (Burnham 2008: 
40).  
3.1.2. Comparative Case Study 
In a study with a qualitative focus, comparative analysis usually involves a limited number of  cases. 
According to Burnham et al, it is seen as the most important research designs in political science, since 
it is a “natural way of  putting information in a context where it can be assessed and 
interpreted” (Burnham, 2008: 69). Burnham et al summarize the most important advantages of  the 
comparative method under four headings (Burnham et al 2008: 80). These are  
1. Contextualization of  knowledge  
2. Improvement of  classifications  
3. Formulation and testing of  hypotheses  
4. Making of  predictions 
In this thesis, it is the first and last would be of  particular relevance in this study. The qualitative focus 
allows me as a researcher to contribute with more knowledge in terms of  the overall strategies of  the 
Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Moreover, a contextualization of  knowledge with regards to the past and 
present strategies of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda can also be used by others in order to make 
predictions about future strategies.  
However, this does not necessarily mean that the findings produced in this thesis about the Islamic Sate 
and Al Qaeda can be used to illustrate general points about terrorism or other extremist groups (to be 
further discussed under Generalizability). Another disadvantage a with a qualitative study is the danger 
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of  oversimplification (Denscombe 2010: 304-305). As previously mentioned, terrorism is a complex 
issue, consisting of  many parts that one needs to take into consideration. This is something I have to 
be aware of  and be transparent about, for instance when it comes to my data (to be further discussed 
under Quality of  the study)  
3.2. Research Process 
The research process consists of  two parts. It starts with examining the strategies of  the Islamic State 
and Al Qaeda according to the operationalization presented below. When the different elements of  the 
organizations’ strategies have been described, it is used as a basis for the analysis of  how the strategy of  
the Islamic State has developed in relation to Al Qaeda’s strategy.  
In the second part of  the research process, the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives are used 
to analyze ways in which the strategy of  the Islamic State has developed, and what influence the 
strategy of  Al Qaeda has had. 
Figure 1: Research Process 
3.2.1. Operationalization of  Terrorist Strategies 
In this section, the operationalization for the first part of  the research process is presented, i.e., how 
the strategies of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda will be examined.  
“Terrorist ideology, no matter how unrealistic, must be taken seriously as a guide to intentions. Coupled with 
analysis of capabilities, it provides a basis for expectations.”
- Martha Crenshaw (1988: 15) 
In the quote above, Martha Crenshaw claims that intentions and capabilities provide a basis for 
expectations, i.e., that you can understand what to expect from terrorist organizations by understanding 
their intentions and capabilities. She also claims that ideology is the key to understanding intentions. 
The operationalization presented in Table 4 is largely based on these assertions. The Intentions category 
is needed in order to understand what a terrorist organization wants to achieve, while the Capabilities 
category is needed in order to understand what they are capable of  doing, i.e., what is possible to achieve.  
Part 1 Empirical evidence Part 2 Analysis
 The Strategy of  Al Qaeda  The Instrumental Perspective
 The Strategy of  the Islamic State  The Organizational Perspective
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When Martha Crenshaw herself  compares the strategies of  old and new terrorist organizations, she 
does it according to their Goals, Methods, and Organization and Resources (Crenshaw 2011: 54). This aligns 
well with the quote above, and therefore these subcategories are added to the initial breakdown.  
In Table 4, the operationalization is presented with examples of  each category. The details of  these 
categories are explained below. 
Table 4: Operationalization with examples of each category 
For Intentions, Ideology and Goals are chosen as the subcategories. In order to determine what a 
terrorist organization wants to achieve, one needs to look at its ideology (which Martha Crenshaw also 
claims in the quote above), and to use it as a “guide” to its intentions. However, one cannot focus only 
on ideology, since ideology alone does not dictate all the intentions of  a terrorist group, especially the 
more practically oriented goals of  changing the status quo.  
For Capabilities, two broad subcategories are chosen: Methods, which are the different actions that the 
terrorist organizations are capable of  doing, and Organization and Resources, which enable certain 
actions. Please see the structure above for examples of  each.  
3.2.2. Analysis 
In the analysis, the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives are used to explain how the strategy 
of  the Islamic State has been developed, using the operationalization as a structure. The two 
perspectives emphasize different factors as explanations to how and why an organization’s strategy 
looks the way it does. For instance, the Instrumental Perspective emphasizes the end goals and values 
of  the organization, while the Organizational Perspective emphasizes the individual members and 
group dynamics. In the analysis, the different parts of  the strategy, i.e., the ideology, goals, methods, 
organization and resources, are explained, and in particular how the different parts are connected.  
Throughout the analysis, different examples from both the Islamic State and Al Qaeda are used. Since 
this thesis is about the development of  the strategy of  the Islamic State in relation to Al Qaeda, several 
ways in which Al Qaeda has influenced the Islamic State are covered. Examples from Al Qaeda are also 
Intentions
Ideology • Beliefs • Purpose
Goals • Vision 
• Long term objectives
Capabilities
Methods • Terrorist attacks and warfare • Recruitment and propaganda
Organization and Resources • Organizational structure • Affiliations
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used as a contrast to the Islamic State, to highlight how differences in their strategies can be explained 
by the theoretical framework.  
3.3. Data Collection  
Since several aspects of  the strategies of  the Islamic State and Al Qaeda are covered, different kinds of  
empirical data are used in this study. The majority is secondary data in the form of  written material, 
such as reports, academic books, and journals, that deal with different aspects of  Islamic State’s and Al 
Qaeda’s strategies. 
Reports and books have been preferred because they provide more in-depth knowledge. Much of  the 
data is written by academics with experience of  Middle Eastern politics in relation to security, religion, 
and history. In this regard, the works of  Daniel Byman, Will McCants, Charles Lister, and Fawas 
Gerges have been of  particular relevance. All of  them have unique knowledge in their respective fields, 
which, combined, have proved to be very valuable for this thesis. 
In another format, this thesis would have have benefitted from the use of  primary sources. This has 
proven to be rather difficult with regard to the longer time frame that would have been needed in order 
to get as a comprehensive picture of  the strategies as possible. Thus, both the scope and the time limit 
of  this thesis have made it difficult to use primary sources.  
As mentioned previously, there is a lot of  data regarding the strategies of  both Al Qaeda and the 
Islamic State, ranging from reports on ideological beliefs to methods of  conducting warfare, finances 
and propaganda. It is however not feasible to go in-depth in each area, since neither time nor space 
would allow it, why the study is limited to the strategic level of  each area.  
This also explain why, for instance the choice was made to examine the propaganda strategies of  the 
Islamic State through the work of  Charlie Winter, whose work show an extensive account of  the 
Islamic State’s propaganda and recruitment strategy. Moreover, since the aim is to look at the strategies 
from the perspective of  the organization, social media accounts of  (proclaimed) jihadists have not been 
taken into account, since there is no way of  telling if  they represent the view of  the whole organization 
or just themselves.  
Table 5 includes the names of  some scholars and reporters that are used as sources, as well as their 
expertise. Table 6 presents types of  data and where it was produced.  
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Table 5: Scholars and reporters 
Table 6: Sources 
3.4. Quality of  the Study 
Good research needs to be credible, and this must be demonstrated in some way for the readers. The 
basis for judging the credibility for research have traditionally been validity, reliability, generalizability 
and objectivity (Denscombe 2010: 297-298).  
3.4.1. Validity  
The question of  validity is essentially whether the study has answered the research question that is 
chosen, or if  some other question is answered. Since only material regarding the Islamic State and Al 
Qaeda has been used, the study should have relatively good validity. However, one can criticize the 
study in that the development of  a terrorist strategy is a very complex issue, and that it is hard to pick 
the right factors to study.  
3.4.2. Reliability 
Reliability concerns whether the results in this study could be replicated by someone else. Since all the 
material is openly available, and the analysis is based on already collected empirical data (i.e., this study 
has not produced any new empirical data), it would be easy to replicate the study. Whether the same 
results, or conclusions, would be reached, is a question of  whether the analysis is properly done. In 
order to make sure that the results are indeed reliable, the analysis has benefitted from the two different 
perspectives, highlighting different factors of  the topic.  
Academics
• Williams McCants: expert on militant Islamism and Islamic scripture  
• Daniel Byman: counterterrorism expert with a focus on Middle Eastern security 
• Fawas Gerges: scholar on Middle Eastern studies and US foreign policy 
• Charles Lister: expert on terrorism, conflicts and insurgency across the Levant 
Academic Journals Policy Reports Books Primary Sources
• Perspectives on 
Terrorism
• Brookings  
• Washington Institute  
• Quilliam 
• Middle East Institute
• The Far Enemy 
• The ISIS Apocalypse 
• The Syrian Jihad 
• Al Qaeda, the Islamic 
State and the global 
jihadist movement
• Bin Laden speeches  
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3.4.3. Generalizability 
Generalizability is to what extent the results in this study can be generalized to other instances of  the 
same phenomenon. Since this study has focused on the Islamic State in particular, it does not aim at 
finding generalizable results that can be applied to other terror groups. However, the author thinks that 
the theoretical framework that was used has a lot of  explanatory power for both the Islamic State and 
Al Qaeda, and that it would probably also work for other terrorist groups, and that the results from this 
study could be used as inspiration for such studies.  
3.4.4. Objectivity 
Objectivity is about being as close to the “objective” truth as possible, and being free from 
subjectivism, preconceived ideas and biases. To make sure that the results of  this study are as objective 
as possible, multiple different reputable sources have been used. Therefore, the empirical evidence 
should be as neutral and unbiased as possible. The analysis on the other hand has benefitted from using 
two different perspectives that in many ways have opposite underlying assumptions. By using different 
assumptions, preconceived notions and a biased way of  thinking can be avoided.  
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4. The Strategy of  Al Qaeda 
In this chapter, the strategy of  Al Qaeda is covered, according to the operationalization mentioned in 
the methodology chapter. To facilitate the reading of  this chapter, the operationalization is presented 
once again in Table 7.  
Table 7: Operationalization 
4.1. Background 
Al-Qaeda was founded in the midst of  the Soviet-Afghan war in the 1980’s by Osama Bin Laden and 
other core operatives (Byman 2015: 3-5). By establishing “a base” (the name Al Qaeda is Arabic for 
base) for Muslim fighters all over the world, the aim was to defend Muslim territory and promote jihad 
(Byman 2015: 14). The invasion of  Afghanistan by the Soviet Union ignited an uprising in which tribal 
as well as Islamist groups took up arms in the name of  Islam, and shaped the ideology of  the first 
global jihadist movement: “Egyptian jihadists met Saudi fighters, and both in turn mixed with Pakistani 
and Libyan figures. Ideas and struggles that in the past had been limited to one community were now 
embraced by many nationalities” (Byman 2015: 4-5). The ensuing defeat of  the Soviet Union also came 
to play a fundamental role in shaping of  the ideology, strategy and organization of  Al Qaeda. With 
their initial focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al Qaeda was considered of  insignificant importance, 
and rather unknown as a terror organization (Byman 2015: 10). In the beginning of  the 1990’s, Bin 
Laden moved to Sudan, where he established The Islamic Army Shura Council, with the aim of  
coordinating different jihadist and insurgent groups from all over the world, and establishing ties with 
their leaders (Byman 2015: 17-20). Bin Laden also aided jihadists in the Muslim world with financial and 
operational support (Byman 2015: 11-12). One group of  particular importance was the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and its leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri (Byman 2015: 17-20). This collaboration played 
an important role in two of  Al Qaeda’s most successful attacks: the 1998 attacks on US embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, and 9/11, which is also what made Al-Qaeda famous. Since then, the group has 
carried out several large-scale attacks, e.g., in Spain and London in 2004. In May 2011, Bin Laden was 
killed by US intelligence officers, and many thought the group would deteriorate as an organization 
Intentions
Ideology • Beliefs 
• Purpose
Goals • Vision • Long term objectives
Capabilities
Methods
• Terrorist attacks/warfare 
• Recruitment 
• Propaganda
Organization and Resources • Organizational structure 
• Affiliations
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after the death of  its leader. This has however not proved to be the case. Al Qaeda and its affiliates 
have taken advantage of  the security vacuums after the Arab spring in Middle East and North Africa, 
as well as exploiting current conflicts in South East Asia.  
4.2. Intentions 
4.2.1. Ideology 
As mentioned in the previous section, the ideology of  Al Qaeda was shaped by the years of  the Soviet 
invasion in Afghanistan, through a blend of  many ideas from a variety of  Muslim communities (Byman 
2015: 14). According to Fawas Gerges, it was in particular the “fusion of  puritanical Salafi-Wahhabism 
and the militant internationalist stand of  the Muslim Brotherhood” that lay the foundation of  “bin 
Ladenism” (Gerges 2009: 85). 
In a more simplified manner, the ideology of  Al Qaeda is a mix of  modern militant Jihadi-Salafism, in 
which Al Qaeda represents the most important organization within the modern jihadi movement 
(Bunzel 2017: 7). Although made up by a variety of  traditions within Islam, jihadism is best understood 
as representing fight for a true Islamic State in need of  restoration (Bunzel 2017: 1). One common 
principle among the different traditions is that the regimes of  the Middle East are ruled by apostates 
that needs to be overthrown and replaced with an Islamic government (Bunzel 2017: 2). Moreover, 
another conviction within the militant school of  jihadism is the practice of  takfir: excommunication of  
Muslims who do not share the views of  the jihadists. In this regard, the jihadists rely heavily on 
Salafism, a purist movement connected with the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia which dates back 
to the mid eighteenth century. According to Bunzel, “Salafism brought to the jihadi movement, a 
single-minded focus on correct belief, meaning the strict and intolerant monotheism” (Bunzel 2017: 8). 
For Al Qaeda, the combination of  Jihadism and Salafism, “Jihadi-Salafism”, thus came to give them the 
theory on which they could base their ideological framework, which further shaped their goals (Bunzel 
2017: 8).  
4.2.2. Goals 
When founded, Al Qaeda declared that their agenda was of  war, and to promote fighters with an 
awareness of  jihad, as well as to create a unified international jihadist movement (Byman 2015: 14). Bin 
Laden’s vision has however not always been clear, with multiple priorities and a mission to defend 
Muslims everywhere in the world (Byman 2015: 13). During the whole 1980’s and mid 1990’s Al Qaeda 
attacked West-friendly regimes in the Middle East (the Near Enemy) such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Algeria (Gerges 2009: 21). However, in the mid 1990’s, a significant shift occurred with regards to the 
perceived enemy: Al Qaeda went from targeting the “apostate” regimes in the Middle East, to the 
United States (the Far enemy). This shift was also specified in declarations with specific goals, such as 
ruling through Sharia law, liberating Muslim lands from enemies, and repel rulers who violated true 
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Islamic laws and principles (Ganor 2015: 114). The main target of  these declarations was the United 
States and Israel, which Bin Laden dubbed as the “Jewish-Crusader alliance” (Bin Laden 2005: 20-30). 
According to Bin Laden, the United States was considered more important to target because they were 
the true oppressors of  Muslims, and indirectly ruled over the apostate regimes, such as Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia.  
From targeting the Near Enemy, the main goals of  Al Qaeda were now to defeat the United States, and 
end their presence in the Middle East, as well as destroying Israel (Byman 2015: 48). According to Bin 
Laden, this also required Muslims to unite, which made a re-orientation of  the jihadist movement 
necessary. Above all, Muslims needed to be educated on Sharia Law and the notion of  Jihad. Only by 
emancipating themselves by gaining knowledge on these issues could Muslim expel the West from the 
Middle East, and end the Israeli occupation of  Palestine. In the end, Bin Laden envisioned a total war 
which would prepare all Muslims to fight, for instance through guerrilla warfare (Gerges 2009: 32).  
The long-time goal of  Al Qaeda is the establishment of  a caliphate in which they can govern according 
to Sharia Law (Byman 2015: 49). A caliphate would also enable the return to what Al Qaeda considers a 
“pure” version of  Islam, and which could be expanded throughout the world (Ganor 2015: 102). This 
is however not discussed in detail, making another goal of  Al Qaeda more important: supporting local 
jihadist groups, since they can spread AQ’s interpretation of  Islam (Byman 2015: 54). Moreover, Al 
Qaeda sees the battlefield as global, in which promoting civil wars and insurgencies is part of  their 
agenda (Byman 2015: 104).  
4.3. Capabilities 
4.3.1. Methods 
War and Terror Campaigns  
War is considered fundamental for the founding and continued existence of  Al Qaeda, as it has been 
since the Soviet years in Afghanistan (Byman 2015: 104). Many of  their methods and tactics are shaped 
by civil wars, and throughout their history, Al Qaeda has engaged in different kinds of  conflicts and 
insurgencies. In the beginning, one major goal in relation to warfare was that of  defensive jihad, i.e., 
protecting Muslim lands and Muslim people from enemies of  Islam, such as (perceived) infidels and 
apostates (Byman 2015: 104). Besides driving away the Soviets from Afghanistan, other areas in which 
Al Qaeda engaged in defensive jihad was Kashmir and Chechnya. Moreover, in relation to the concept 
of  defensive jihad is the foreign fighter phenomenon. In this regard, Afghanistan was considered a 
learning opportunity for fighters who learned urban warfare, guerrilla tactics and how to use explosives. 
A few where also chosen to get more advanced training in terrorism, such as surveillance, assassination, 
and recruitment of  new members (Byman 2015: 23). 
!26
The loss of  Afghanistan as a safe haven after 9/11 changed the modus operandi of  Al Qaeda. From 
being able to operate in a more central chain of  command, outside pressure, among other things, 
caused Al Qaeda to decentralize their methods (Byman 2015: 105, 122). In this regard, civil wars and 
insurgencies have had unexpected benefits. Apart from spreading jihad through local groups, the 
strategy of  aiding insurgencies has had the effect of  creating security voids in which new safe havens 
can be established. This kind of  “progressive destabilization in phases” also gives Al Qaeda the ability 
to operate openly (Wright 2016:19). According to Byman, Al Qaeda “seeks to exhaust its enemy 
through a strategy of  attrition” (Byman 2015: 51-52). This strategy was applied during the Afghan-
Soviet War, and was indeed successful in forcing back the Soviets.  
It is however the suicide attacks that have come to shape the modus operandi of  Al Qaeda, and have 
become “the hallmark” of  the organization (Gerges 2009: 142-143). After all, suicide attacks marked 
the first major attack of  Al Qaeda: the 1998 bombings, and later, the 9/11 attacks. In this regard, 
Zawahiri and the Egyptian jihadists have been particularly influential in promoting suicide missions as a 
terrorist tactic. Suicide missions were used by Zawahiri and his group as early as 1993, in an attempt to 
kill the Egyptian Interior minister (Byman 2015: 55). Moreover, Zawahiri considers the appeal for 
suicide missions to have several benefits: they are seen as effective, shocking and inexpensive (Byman 
2015: 56). Moreover, since the suicide bombers plan to die, simple defenses can be avoided, making the 
suicide bomb a “smart” tactic, as well as making Al Qaeda stand out in terms of  commitment and 
zealotry (Byman 2015: 56). The use of  suicide bombers can also be used in what Byman calls “large-
scale dramatic attacks against strategic or symbolic targets,” as the 1998 bombings and 9/11 exemplify 
(Byman & Williams 2015). This is based on the ‘Hezbollah model’ in which Hezbollah 1983 bombed 
multilateral peacekeeping forces in Beirut, resulting in the deaths of  241 American and 56 French 
soldiers. Moreover, it also led to withdrawal of  all international forces within a year.  
Propaganda and Recruitment  
Propaganda has been a fundamental tool since the years in Afghanistan (Byman 2015: 84). At that time, 
Bin Laden published the magazine Al Jihad, in which pictures from the battlefield were used to raise 
money and recruit new members. The purpose of  Al Qaeda propaganda is to inspire the broader 
Muslim community to support them, and the themes usually center around the oppression of  Muslims 
from non-Muslims, threatening the West, and influencing militant organizations to join Al Qaeda.  
Besides being considered as the ultimate tactic by Zawahiri, suicide missions have a high media 
coverage, making it useful for propaganda purposes. In this regard, Zawahiri also aims to spread a 
culture of  martyrdom by making it seem glorious and righteous. (Byman 2015: 56). 
Another important media source for Al Qaeda has been video messages in which Bin Laden 
videotaped operations and statements by “future-martyrs,” with the aim of  inspiring (Byman 2015: 85). 
Before 9/11, Bin Laden also gave a few interviews. However, according to Byman and Williams, Al 
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Qaeda has not been particularly innovative when it comes to producing propaganda, relying on “long 
videos featuring senior Al Qaeda ideologues pontificating about various aspects of  jihad and quoting 
extensively from the Koran” (Byman & Williams 2015). Moreover, in contrast to other jihadist groups 
(such as the Islamic State), Al Qaeda seem to rely on older internet platforms, such as online forums, to 
a larger extent.  
When it comes to recruitment, Al Qaeda has been able to recruit new members in mosques and 
schools, including technical and engineering colleges (Byman 2015: 10; Bloom 2016: 605-606). 
According to Mia Bloom, Al Qaeda has always been rather selective in their recruitment criteria (Bloom 
2016: 605). In this regard, the recruitment of  Al Qaeda has worked through ‘talent spotters’ who 
recruit potential members based on two criteria: 1) perceived level of  commitment to the Islamist 
cause, and 2) their skills and psychological durability. Moreover, potential Al Qaeda members has had to 
undergo both spiritual preparation and basic military and survival training (Bloom 2016: 615).  
4.3.2. Organization and Resources  
Organizational Structure 
According to Byman, it can be rather difficult to talk about Al Qaeda as one organization (Byman 2015: 
95). Although outside pressure has led the organization to become more decentralized and network 
based, the fact that Al Qaeda at times uses a hybrid of  centralized and decentralized methods makes it 
even more difficult to talk about Al Qaeda as single organization. In general, Al Qaeda has tried to 
maintain their hierarchical structure which defined Al Qaeda during their initial phase in the Afghan-
Soviet War. During this time, the members swore loyalty to Bin Laden as their emir. In the beginning, Al 
Qaeda also relied on specific committees that dealt with some part of  the organization, such as military 
operations, finances, foreign affairs, administration, religious matters, propaganda, intelligence and 
internal security, etc. In addition, Al Qaeda also consisted of  an advisory committee composed of  top 
members, in which the second highest decisions were made.  
Since 9/11 and the loss of  Afghanistan as a safe haven, the activities of  Al Qaeda has focused on 
aspects of  control and coordination in connection to its affiliates. In this regard, senior Al Qaeda 
members seem to have had a direct hand in the most important operations.  
Today, the Al Qaeda core centers around Ayman Al-Zawahiri as their top leader (Byman 2015: 157). 
The core around him consists of  dedicated and skilled operatives, probably no more than a hundred, 
who have “transferred their loyalty” from Bin Laden to Zawahiri upon Bin Laden’s death. According to 
Byman, these are the ones that see themselves as the “vanguard elite,” who truly understand the 
interests of  Muslims (Byman 2015: 157). Moreover, the core of  Al Qaeda is believed to have focused 
on the high-profile terrorist attacks, for instance the 1998 embassy bombings and 9/11. Despite 
decentralization, the organizational structure of  the the highest level is still maintained in some 
respects, for instance, by core members exercising strategic command and control, in which Al Qaeda 
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only deals with centralization on a broad level and through strategic leadership (Byman 2015: 95-96). 
Charles Lister emphasizes the appointment of  a global deputy leader for operating Al Qaeda’s most 
strategically valuable zone as a key mechanism in avoiding taking decentralization to far (Lister 2017: 4). 
Being forced to adapt since the Soviet War, Al Qaeda has had time to develop their organizational skills 
as a “learning organization” in which there is a willingness for self-evaluation (Byman 2015: 96). In this 
regard, core operatives are for instance allowed to criticize leaders, and operations are evaluated. 
Affiliates 
Cooperation with other groups has been a fundamental part of  Al Qaeda's activities since its creation, 
but sometimes, Al Qaeda has also sought more formal alliances through the creation of  affiliates: 
independent organizations accept the authority and goals of  Zawahiri, and in return, gets to use the Al 
Qaeda label (Lister 2016). As of  today, Al Qaeda has five affiliates: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQIP), Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Al-
Shahbaab, and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (although rebranded itself  in 2016 and claims to no longer be an 
affiliate). All these groups are considered as either insurgent or terror groups that have participated in 
mass causality terrorist attacks (Wright 2016: 21). They follow the statements and strategic vision of  the 
Al Qaeda core, as well as implementing a local strategy of  destruction. In line with Al Qaeda’s own 
long-term objectives, this means devoting resources to fighting both the near and the far enemy. 
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Figure 2: Al Qaeda and its aﬃliates 
As mentioned, this process of  formalized relationships escalated after 9/11 and the loss of  Afghanistan
—the core had to find new ways in order to remain active. Furthermore, affiliations make Al Qaeda a 
powerful global terror organization, since it helps the Al Qaeda brand to gain access to conflict zones 
which would otherwise have been difficult to take part in (Byman 2015: 151). By affiliating with Al 
Qaeda, local fighters gain military experience and tactics. Moreover, the best practices is shared to all 
affiliates through Al Qaeda’s communications network. According to Byman, some of  the most 
important learning take place on the strategic level: failures and successes are evaluated before being 
communicated to affiliates (Byman 2015: 151). This is a lesson learned through the affiliation of  Al 
Qaeda in Iraq, and their overall brutality towards Sunni tribes and Muslim civilians (such as the Shia) 
which came to “tarnish” the Al Qaeda brand (Byman 2015: 151). As a consequence, the Al Qaeda core 
and their affiliates have become much more responsive when it comes to respecting local grievances 
and identities. Moreover, this strategy around local goals has intensified during the civil war in Syria and 
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in Yemen, where Al Qaeda focuses on building alliances in which they grow stronger within the 
unstable and repressed societies (Lister 2016: 2). In this regard, Al Qaeda also avoids seeming too 
repressive by restraining their harsh form of  Sharia law: doing so make them appear as a “favored 
alternative to the pre-existing status quo” (Lister 2016: 2). 
Resources 
According to Byman, Al Qaeda has over the years raised money in creative ways (2015: 109). In the 
early days, the personal wealth of  Bin Laden funded much of  Al Qaeda’s campaigns. Later on, when 
governments seized his assets, Bin Laden drew on the Golden Chain: a ‘charity’ system in which money 
is transferred through hawala, an informal system. Through hawala, individuals from different countries 
can pass the same amount of  money to the intended receiver. Another source of  income has been 
fundraising through charities, such as their own and those which Al Qaeda has infiltrated.  
Previously, affiliates used to get money from Al Qaeda, but in recent years, the flow has been reversed: 
money is going from the affiliates to the core (Bauer & Levitt 2017: 93). The most common means of  
raising money for the affiliates is through kidnapping for ransom and extortion: between 2008 and 
2014, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) received more than $100 million in ransom (Bauer & 
Levitt: 94). Another means of  receiving money for the affiliates is through cooperation with other 
groups: Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, for instance, cooperates with Al Shabab in Somalia, and Al 
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent are, according to UN, in an active collaboration with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan (Bauer & Levitt 2017: 100). 
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5. The Strategy of  the Islamic State 
In this chapter, the strategy of  the Islamic State is covered, according to the operationalization 
mentioned in the methodology chapter. To facilitate the reading of  this chapter, the operationalization 
is presented once again in Table 8. 
Table 8: Operationalization 
5.1. Background 
The Islamic State originally emerged as an affiliate of  Al Qaeda (Wright 2016: 10). It was formed by a 
Jordanian jihadist by the name of  Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, with the help of  seed money from 
Bin Laden. It was however not until after the US invasion of  Iraq in 2003 that Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
was formed, and would eventually evolve into the Islamic State. The chaotic political landscape in Iraq 
after the demise of  Saddam Hussein, and the invasion of  US forces, created the base for Zarqawi to 
start conducting terror campaigns (Lister 2015: 266). During this period, Zarqawi eventually merged 
with several other jihadist groups, and renamed AQI to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) (Lister 2015: 266). 
Early on, Zarqawi had a sectarian, i.e., dogmatic, dimension in his terror campaigns, for instance by 
attacking Shi’a. In 2006, Zarqawi was killed by a US airstrike, and in 2008, US troops and Iraqi tribes 
managed to drive away ISI from its strongholds, as well as killing and imprisoning some core members. 
(Lister 2015). In 2010, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi became the leader of  ISI. In the following years, the 
group also managed to rebuild itself, enabled by a new leadership, in combination with the failing 
domestic politics in Iraq, among other things (Lister 2015: 93). In an attempt to consolidate his own 
ambitions, the Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki attempted to coerce and restrain protests, and to 
exclude Sunnis from power, which all played a significant role in the the support given to Baghdadi. 
The chaos that was created in Syria also benefited the cause of  the Islamic State. In 2011, Zawahiri 
urged jihadists to travel to Syria and fight, and Baghdadi sent small numbers of  fighters to recruit and 
raise money (Lister 2015: 63, 70-71).  
Intentions
Ideology • Beliefs 
• Purpose
Goals • Vision • Long term objectives
Capabilities
Methods
• Terrorist attacks/warfare 
• Recruitment 
• Propaganda
Organization and Resources • Organizational structure 
• Affiliations
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In 2013, ISI changed their name to the Islamic State of  Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), in an effort to declare 
the control over these fighters in Syria, and to formally expand the project of  statehood. In January 
2014, the Islamic State seized the provincial capital Raqqa from the Nusra Front, in its pursuit of  
building a state, despite being against the wishes of  Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. One 
month later, Al Qaeda Core severed its ties with the Islamic State—a split regarded as having a major 
impact on the jihadist movement (Wright 2016: 10). On the night of  Ramadan, in June 2014, Baghdadi 
officially declared the Islamic State as a caliphate with its own government, economy, and army. A 
formal bureaucracy with institutions was also created, and managed with a hard-line interpretation of  
Islam. Moreover, Baghdadi urged fellow Muslims to come and join in the state building of  the 
caliphate. In June 2014, the Islamic State also advanced military in Iraq, seizing Mosul, the second 
largest city in Iraq, as well as launching attacks across the provinces of  Ninawa, Salah ad Din, Diyala, 
Kirkuk and Anbar (Lister 2015: 232). Moreover, the extreme brutality of  the Islamic State and their 
uncompromising attitude became known to a wider public, with public beheadings of  prisoners, killing 
and enslavement of  religious minorities such as the Yazidis, mass executions of  the Shi'a, and suicide 
bombings (Lister 2015: 298). In 2015, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for several large-scale 
attacks in both Europe and in Iraq. By the end of  2016, between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign fighters 
had traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State and other jihadist groups. Jihadists with professions such 
as engineers, accountants, teachers, etc., also traveled to Syria and the Caliphate (Wright 2017: 10). 
According to Pentagon in late 2016, around 90% of  IS members in Iraq were of  Iraqi origin whilst 
70% of  IS fighters of  in Syria were local jihadists. In 2017, the Islamic State lost several of  their cities, 
e.g., Mosul and Raqqa, and is today dramatically diminished territorially. The group is however said to 
be operating in other places, and are, like other jihadist groups, exploiting the security vacuums that are 
fueled by wars and conflicts, most notably in North Africa.  
5.2. Intentions 
5.2.1. Ideology 
The ideology of  the Islamic State is a mix between the Salafi-Jihadism of  Al Qaeda, and identity 
politics (Gerges 2016: 24). Some of  the group’s motivations can be traced to their ideological roots of  
Salafi-Jihadism, whilst others are a consequence of  what Gerges calls “a hyper Sunni-identity, driven by 
an intrinsic and even genocidal anti-Shia ideology” (Gerges 2016: 24). To one extent, this anti-Shia 
ideology hails from Zarqawi's own hatred of  Shia Muslims, who he believed had united with the Jews 
and Christians (McCants 2015: 226). According to Will McCants, the sectarian ideology of  the Islamic 
State hails from their interaction with old Islamic texts and prophecies about the End Days (McCants 
2015: 39-40). Moreover, these prophecies have sectarian dimensions to them, making them resonate 
with today’s conflicts (McCants 2015: 178). In these texts, the ideas about the apocalypse, i.e., the final 
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battle between “good and evil,” and revolution, i.e., the overthrowing of  governments, goes hand in 
hand with the caliphate as God’s kingdom on earth (McCants 2015: 45-47).  
Already in 2006, Zarqawi considered the establishment of  a caliphate necessary, since it would 
represent the state of  true Islam and help AQI to expel the Shi'a from Iraq (McCants 2015: 22). In 
2006, shortly after Zarqawi's death, his successor, Abu Ayyub al-Masri did not hesitate to declare the 
Islamic State of  Iraq (ISI), thinking a caliphate was needed for the final apocalyptic battle (McCants 
2015: 71). This idea has been further narrated by Baghdadi, although with a more focus on state 
building and actual governing institutions (McCants 2015: 317). Above all, Baghdadi have sought to 
demonstrate the idea of  the caliphate as an obligation for all Muslims to live in. For Baghdadi, the idea 
of  a caliphate is both religious and political: by pledging allegiance to the valid caliph (Baghdadi), 
Muslims would also affirm Sunni Islamic identity. Cultural cleansing of  alien elements, such as other 
religions, and even local Sunni practices, are parts of  Baghdadi's idea of  a true Islamic State (Gerges 
2016: 30). According to McCants, the are no grey zones in the world view of  Islamic State (McCants 
2015: 36). 
Thus, the notion of  brutality is a fundamental concept in the ideology of  the Islamic State, and works 
in tandem with their millenarianism: neither competition nor diversity of  ideas are allowed. In this 
regard, the brutality in the Islamic State’s ideology is delineated in showing strength and power 
(McCants 2015: 316). Moreover, in order to justify their brutality and showing their strength, the 
Islamic State have in some cases gone against Qur’anic regulations, which, according to McCants, is a 
way of  distinguishing themselves from other groups through provocation: “it is almost as if  the group 
does extreme things to create opportunities for demonstrating its scholarly dexterity and burnishing its 
ultraconservative bona fides" (McCants 2015: 226). One such example of  religious controversy was, for 
instance, the immolation of  the Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh for apostasy, which caused outrage 
in the Muslim community (and even among Al Qaeda ideologues) since it is strictly forbidden in the 
Qur’an to burn someone, even for heresy (McCants 2015: 214). According to the Islamic State, this was 
however deemed as a necessary act of  showing strength against their enemy: the pilot represented the 
apostate kingdom of  Jordan who had targeted the Islamic State through a number of  airstrikes.  
Another example of  ideological zealousness in relation to brutality, is the Islamic State’s involvement in 
the sex trade and enslavement of  Yazidi women and girls (Gerges 2016: 32). According to Gerges, 
besides male power and patriarchy, these actions are undertaken to represent the ‘authenticity’ in their 
ideology: “Baghdadi and his organization wants to ‘distinguish themselves’ from Islamist rivals by 
attempting to revive traditions, rituals, and practices that have been dormant for over a thousand years 
in Muslim history” (Gerges 2016: 32).  
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5.2.2. Goals 
In line with their ideology, the most important goal is the establishment of  a caliphate: a true Islamic 
State, by governing the captured areas in Iraq and Syria (Byman 2015: 171). This makes fighting local 
and regional enemies the most urgent goal: eliminating the Iraqi government, the Assad regime in Syria, 
and disloyal Sunnis is the top priority. By doing so, the Islamic State can further expand their territory 
as proclaimed by their motto: baqiya wa tatamd, or “lasting and expanding.” 
5.3. Capabilities 
5.3.1. Methods 
War and Terror Campaigns  
The warfare strategy and territorial success of  the Islamic State depends on several things, such as the 
military capabilities and strategic planning of  Baghdadi with regards to terror operations (Lister 2015: 
274-276). In tandem with the warfare strategy of  the Islamic State, their military capabilities have 
played an important role in their success. According to Lister, this is because of  the importance of  the 
military element in the identity of  the Islamic State as a terror organization (Lister 2016: 274). With 
regards to warfare, the Islamic State has, for instance, been able to remain militarily strong, and to 
impose defeats on their enemies, and has also controlled several strategic border crossings within Syria 
(Byman 2015: 173). When seizing territory from Syrian and Iraqi armies, the Islamic State has also 
managed to take large amounts of  arms, e.g., US weaponry that had been provided to the Iraqi 
government, surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank weapons, Humvees, tanks and (unarmed) surveillance 
drones (Byman 2015: 173).  
Although much of  this can be attributed to the weakness of  the regimes in Iraq, and Syria, the 
territorial expansion of  the Islamic State can also be explained with regards to the strategic investments 
and planning by Baghdadi and his core operatives (Lister 2015: 276). Baghdadi has, for instance, relied 
on the operational expertise of  both former Iraqi army and police officers, skilled Chechen trainers and 
AQI veterans. As a consequence, the Islamic State uses a mix of  warfare tactics, both conventional and 
unconventional (guerrilla) fighting, in which they have been capable of  carrying out-large scale 
offensives against Iraqi and Syrian military brigades (Lister 2015: 275; Gerges 2016: 149).  
In addition, Baghdadi has also invested in training new fighters, in both religious studies as well as 
military training. According to Lister, new recruits have usually been placed on guard and frontline duty 
before moving on with more operational and offensive operations (Lister 2016: 275). In this regard, 
Baghdadi have in particular relied on the foreign fighters and the use of  suicide bombers (Lister 2016: 
276; Gerges 2016: 274).  
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According to Lister, the Islamic State participate in three kinds of  military operations: mass casualty 
targets towards minorities, attritional campaigns, and full-scale sieges and operations (Lister 2015: 
274-276). The mass casualty targets against minorities have dual purposes: besides killing minorities and 
undermining the lack of  security in large cities such as Baghdad, the Islamic State hopes to fuel the 
sectarian conflicts with retaliation attacks by Shia militias towards Sunnis (Lister 2015: 275). The 
attritional attacks towards security personnel are committed in order to reduce their capabilities and 
societal support structures. This has also included methodical infiltration of  Islamic State fighters in 
Iraqi societies, in which individual army and police officers have been targeted in their homes. The last 
kind of  terror campaigns, i.e., the full-scale sieges, are meant to display the military element of  the 
Islamic State. In this regard, fighters are positioned like a light infantry force who operates in an 
organized manner with tanks, artillery and heavy weapons. 
Propaganda and Recruitment 
The intentions and military success of  the Islamic State’s terror campaigns have also played an 
important role when it comes to their propaganda and recruitment: strategies with regards to the 
attention that the group has gained both in the media as well as through their own channels.  
Moreover, the level of  ‘sophistication’ in the sense of  style of  editing and staging have also made the 
Islamic State known for their propaganda as being ‘invigorating,’ for instance with references to video 
games and movies (Byman & Williams 2015). Besides distribution through their media organization Al 
Hayat Media and magazines such as Dabiq, the Islamic State has also created an app: The Dawn of  the 
Glad Tidings (Wilson 2017: 4). By making users sign away their privacy rights when installing the app, the 
Islamic State gained access to their contacts and Twitter accounts, with which they could upload their 
propaganda. According to Byman and Williams, the Islamic State also encourages bottom-up 
propaganda, for instance by recruiters bringing smartphones to record and share what happens on the 
battlefield, and by enabling ‘crowdsourcing of  jihad’ (Byman & Williams 2015).  
The Islamic State has recruited different kinds of  people, ranging from foreign fighters to young 
women, to families with children, and people wanting to contribute with their expertise from their 
professions. During the extension phase of  the caliphate, the propaganda of  the Islamic State was 
modeled to attract different kinds of  recruits (Bloom 2016: 616). Themes or narratives have thus varied 
depending on the target group, although the theme of  brutality stands out by far as the most prominent 
one, since it serves a dual purpose: threatening the West, and at the same time attracting potential 
recruits by showing strength (Winter 2015). Charlie Winter, who has studied the propaganda of  the 
Islamic State in detail, emphasizes that their propaganda entices a specific way of  living for potential 
recruits: both immediate and in the long run (Winter 2015: 2). Besides the theme of  brutality, Winter 
distinguishes between five other narratives such as mercy, victimhood, war, belonging, and utopianism. 
While brutality is the most common theme, utopianism is regarded as the most important one: Muslims 
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can live the rightful life here on earth, by moving to the only true Islamic State—Baghdadi’s caliphate 
(Winter 2015: 2, 29).  
According to Winter, the utopianism in the propaganda resonates powerfully with the narrative of  the 
apocalypse or “apocalyptic utopianism” (Winter 2015: 28). The apocalyptic message has in particular 
been successful in several ways when it comes to recruiting foreign fighters. First, it attracts people to 
join the fight in Syria, which, as previously mentioned, is important in the narrative of  the apocalypse. 
Second, it also works towards making people more brutal and ruthless on the battlefield. As already 
mentioned, foreign fighters with no ties to the local community have specifically worked as “shock 
troops” in being ruthless and barbaric (Gerges 2016: 274). Moreover, it also works to increase the sense 
of  urgency for the potential recruit (Winter 2015: 29-30). 
5.3.2. Organization and Resources 
Organization 
The success, brutality, and even the audacity of  the Islamic State as a terrorist organization in many 
ways reflect the personal story of  AQIs founder Zarqawi Arriving too late to fight the Soviets in 
Afghanistan. In 1989, Zarqawi went home to Jordan and got in-prisoned due to terrorist activities. In 
prison, he got to know more Salafi-jihadists, and became further radicalized (Warrick 2015: 129-132). 
Some years later, Zarqawi travelled to Kandahar and eventually managed to persuade Bin Laden and 
Zawahiri to help him stir up an insurgency in the lands of  the Levant (Warrick 2015: 132). However, 
due to Zarqawi's extremist (even according to jihadist standards) and sectarian views in who counted as 
a good Muslim, he was looked upon with suspicion by the Al Qaeda Core, for instance with regards to 
Zarqawi’s hatred of  the Shi'a (McCants 2015: 17). Nonetheless, the Al Qaeda core needed to establish a 
base in the countries of  the Levant and provided Zarqawi with seed money, since his Jordanian 
connections could be useful. Zarqawi, on the other hand, would not have to be obliged to swear loyalty 
or accept every point of  Al Qaeda’s ideology—it was more about “coordination and cooperation” in 
order to reach joint objectives (Warrick 2015: 132). In 2002, Zarqawi, who sensed the forthcoming of  a 
US invasion, moved to Iraq to establish terror cells by exploiting the security voids that would rise after 
the fall of  Saddam Hussein’s regime. Despite being successful in his terror attacks, in 2004, Zarqawi 
proposed a merger with Al Qaeda. His aim and strategy was to provoke the Shi’a and ignite a sectarian 
conflict, which would also defeat the transitional government (McCants 2015: 24-26). Al Qaeda, who 
had lost their safe haven in Afghanistan, and had run a disastrous terror campaign in Saudi Arabia, saw 
no choice but to merge, since they wanted to have a part in the Sunni uprisings against the United 
States. However, already in 2005, the core started raising objections towards Zarqawi's violent methods, 
such as his public beheadings of  foreign journalists, aid-workers, attacks on Shi’ite Mosques, and 
attacks on Sunni scholars that AQI believed to be heretics, but whose support Al Qaeda needed in 
order to cooperate with the Sunni tribes (McCants 2015: 29). 
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Moreover, Al Qaeda feared that Zarqawi's brutality would alienate ordinary Muslims as well as tarnish 
the Al Qaeda brand (McCants 2015). However, Zarqawi continued to fuel sectarian conflicts between 
Sunnis and Shi'a, hoping that this would gather more Sunnis to AQI. He also merged AQI with other 
groups, and in 2006, Zarqawi started speaking about the necessity of  establishing an Islamic State as 
soon as possible in order to expel the enemy.  
After Zarqawi's death in 2006, his successor Masri dissolved AQI and proclaimed The Islamic State in 
Iraq (ISI) since he believed that Mahdi, a Muslim savior mentioned in prophecies, would come, and the 
caliphate would assist him during the apocalypse (McCants 2015: 52). In 2006, ISI, with the help of  
other jihadist groups, managed to seize some territories, such as the Anbar Province and Ninewa, in 
which they consolidated their power (McCants 2015: 70, 300, 316). However, the brutality of  ISI 
alienated many Sunnis. ISI began targeting civilians and other jihadist groups, and some of  them wrote 
an open letter to Bin Laden, criticizing his Iraqi franchise: “They threaten some members of  the group 
with death if  they do not swear allegiance to Al Qaeda or its other names” (McCants 2015: 55-56).  
According to McCants, one part of  this problem is related to the fact that ISI had allowed too many 
people to become members without proper vetting, and thus encouraged ‘rouge’ elements. Another 
problem was Masri’s lack of  leadership skills, who was too occupied with thinking about the Mahdi 
prophecy (McCants 2015: 56, 58, 77). Moreover, the foreign core within ISI did not understand the 
ways of  the Iraqis well, and even some of  its own members complained. All of  this eventually led to an 
erosion of  ISI’s base support among Iraqi Sunnis. In 2008, some of  the Sunni Tribes, with the help of  
US backed forces, managed to expel ISI. 
The second and the third leader of  ISI both died in 2010, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was chosen as the 
new emir, something that would change the structure of  ISI considerably. The leadership of  ISI 
consisted of  foreign fighters, which caused rifts between the foreign fighters and the Iraqi jihadists 
(Zarqawi was Jordanian, and Masri Egyptian) (McCants 2015: 119). However, Baghdadi managed to go 
between these factions, much due to his 10-month experience in a US detention centre, in which he 
built ties to both former Saddam members as well as AQI jihadists (McCants 2015: 118). When 
Baghdadi was appointed leader, he made sure to bring with him the Iraqis who were already trained in 
military and intelligence matters, as well as the jihadists with experience in running an insurgency. 
Baghdadi eventually consolidated his power by purging ISI leaders that were suspected of  disloyalty, 
and replaced them with Iraqis (many who had served in the regime of  Saddam Hussein) (McCants 
2015: 123). Baghdadi also launched the “Breaking of  Walls” campaign, that freed hundreds of  AQI 
members from Iraqi prisons. In addition, between December 2009 and January 2010, ISI evaluated 
their failure through a policy document with the name “The Strategic Plan” (McCants 2015: 124-128). 
In this, recommendations where given on how to succeed with coming attacks, and managing the Sunni 
tribes with incentives, much like the Americans had done. 
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From 2010, and during its most successful years (until 2017), the Islamic State was a controlled and 
bureaucratic organization with a strict hierarchy, designed to act and behave like a state (Lister 2015: 
271). Lister describes the structure as a pyramid with Baghdadi as the supreme leader, or caliph. Below 
Baghdadi are his deputies for Syria and Iraq as well as his advisers, and below them is a cabinet of  
ministers, and a twelve-man military council. As the caliph, Baghdadi has supreme political and religious 
authority, although he relied on his deputies who oversaw the captured territories, as well as managed 
the administration.  
Resources and Finances:  
The territorial gains of  the Islamic State have also led them to controlling resources, such as 
hydroelectric dams and oil refineries (Byman & Williams 2015). At their height of  power, the Islamic 
State oversaw some of  the most profitable oil resources in Iraq and Syria, in which they produced 
50,000 barrels of  oil every day, to sell on the black market. According to Byman, oil smuggling grossed 
around $2 million a day in September 2014. In addition, ransoms, and taxing local populations have 
also helped fund the Islamic State. The money that Islamic State generated was used to recruit and pay 
fighters, as well as giving them bonuses when they married and had children (thus expanding the 
caliphate). 
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6. Analysis 
This chapter contains the analysis of  the strategy of  the Islamic State and its development in relation to 
Al Qaeda. The analysis is in two parts: first, according to the Instrumental Perspective, and second, 
according to the Organizational Perspective. However, before that, a short recap of  the differences 
between the strategies of  Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is presented.  
6.1. Overview of  the Strategies of  Al Qaeda and the Islamic State 
For purposes of  clarity, an overview of  the strategies of  Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is presented in 
Table 9.  
Table 9: An Overview of the Strategies of Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
6.2. The Instrumental Perspective  
According to the Instrumental Perspective, the purpose of  terrorism is to bring about a change in an 
actor’s environment, and is used as a means to achieve this goal—it represents a strategic choice. In this 
section, the focus is on how the strategy of  the Islamic State has developed as a result of  their 
Area Al Qaeda The Islamic State
INTENTIONS
Ideology & 
Goals 
• Jihadism and Salafism 
• Shift from Near Enemy to Far Enemy (the West) 
• Create a caliphate sometime in the future 
• Supporting local jihadist groups - winning hearts 
and minds 
• Main goal: Spread Islamic ideas and inspire
• Jihadism and Salafism 
• Apocalypse and State-building 
• Brutality and Sectarianism 
• Main goal: Create a caliphate now 
CAPABILITIES
Warfare & 
Terror attacks
• Defensive Jihad 
• Focus on the Far Enemy  
• A strategy of  attrition & innovative attacks  
• Large scale symbolic attacks on the West 
• Suicide bombings & martyrdom
• Exploited security vacuums in Iraq and Syria 
• Mass casualty attacks towards minorities as a 
retaliation and escalation strategy  
• Attritional campaigns towards security forces 
• Full-scale sieges and attacks on military facilities 
• Brutality
Propaganda & 
Recruitment 
• From fatwas to online propaganda  
• Longer “tirades” and Koranic sermons 
• “Talent-spotting” strategy 
• Elitism
• Social media  
• High level of  ‘sophistication’ with editing and 
pop-cultural references  
• Modeled to attract different kinds of  recruits  
• Brutality and utopianism most common themes
Organization 
& Resources
• Hybrid of  centralized to decentralized structure 
• Formalized affiliations 
• Financing through wealthy individuals (e.g., Bin 
Laden), charities, and affiliates 
• Created as an affiliate to Al Qaeda 
• 3rd leader Baghdadi purged leadership and 
united organization 
• Centralized and hierarchical structure 
• Resources: Territory have provided IS with oil 
and taxes of  local population
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intentions and collective values, and how they use terrorism as a means to achieve their ends, but also 
on comparing the Islamic State to Al Qaeda. If  intentions shape strategy, different intentions should 
result in different strategies. This is used to explain the differences between the strategies of  Al Qaeda 
and the Islamic State.  
6.2.1. Intentions 
According to the Instrumental Perspective, an organization acts as a unit, on the basis of  collective 
values. To understand the strategy of  an organization, one needs to understand the underlying values 
and goals that the strategy is designed to achieve. 
The Islamic State has one major goal: the creation of  a caliphate. To create a caliphate, they need land, 
people to govern and run the society, and all the different societal functions, e.g., healthcare, education, 
legal system, military, etc. As will be shown, this goal shapes many parts of  their strategy. Apart from 
the goal of  creating a caliphate, the Islamic State is founded upon other collective values, such as 
sectarianism and brutality. They are considered necessary components in order to create the right kind 
of  caliphate, one which is cleansed from unwanted elements. 
As delineated in the empirical data in the previous section, much of  the brutality and sectarianism of  
the Islamic State hails from their interaction with old texts, in which violence against minorities is 
‘sanctioned’ and even encouraged. In this regard, the collective values of  the Islamic State shape the 
rest of  their strategies.  
While Al Qaeda also wants to form a caliphate, this goal is further into the future. Their current focus 
is to fight the Far Enemy and give strength to the whole jihadist movement by supporting local jihadist 
groups all over the world with training, logistics and inspiration in how to wage defensive jihad against 
the enemy: The focus of  Al Qaeda is thus much more global or transnational, which in turn has shaped 
the rest of  their strategies in a different way than the Islamic State.  
In the following sections, the effects of  these intentions on the other parts of  the strategy is explored.  
6.2.2. Warfare and Terror Attacks 
Capturing and defending land is fundamental to the Islamic State’s goal of  creating a caliphate. To 
achieve this, ISIS uses terrorism as a learning process. In this regard, terror operations are the 
consequence of  the combined skill and experience of  former jihadists as well as security and 
intelligence officers from Saddam Hussein’s Baathist Party. In other words, the Islamic States method 
of  conducting terrorism has been successful since it has been characterized by people who already 
know how to wage war, and to run an authoritarian and brutal government, as well as training new 
people in security and intelligence operations. 
!40
In contrast, the terror attacks by Al Qaeda are distinguished by surprise attacks against symbolic targets 
against the Far Enemy, i.e., suicide missions against targets that represent the United States or the West. 
In addition, and in line with their intentions, the suicide missions of  Al Qaeda are also undertaken with 
the aim of  inspiring and electrifying the Muslim community, for instance, through innovative means of  
attacking the enemy. The best example of  this is 9/11, in which Al Qaeda managed to innovate the 
tactic of  attrition by combing several kinds of  terror tactics, i.e., suicide missions and hijackings. This 
shows that differences in warfare strategies can be derived from differences in intentions.  
According to the Instrumental Perspective, using terrorism as a strategic choice is based both on the 
ends and the means of  the organization. If  the organization is weak or small compared to its enemies, 
it can use surprise to compensate for this weakness. The Islamic State is a good illustration of  this, in 
that they have used surprise attacks, as well as a general strategy of  attrition. As mentioned, some of  
the attacks, such as attritional terror campaigns towards Iraqi security personnel, are engaged by the 
organization in order to reduce the enemies’ capabilities and show the weakness of  the Iraqi state. By 
using attrition, the Islamic States can use its resources more efficiently towards achieving their goal of  
creating a caliphate.  
However, to truly surprise the enemy, one needs to not only be unpredictable when it comes to the 
time and place of  the attacks, but also on the nature of  the attacks themselves. Succeeding in this can 
be considered doctrinal innovations. The Islamic State’s terror attacks on minority communities in the 
large cities can be regarded as one such example. On the one hand, targeting Shi’a (and other 
minorities) is a part of  their intentions and collective values. However, by hoping that Shia militias will 
retaliate by attacking Sunnis, the Islamic State also wishes to exacerbate the sectarian tensions further, 
and thus create a case for their apocalyptic visions. These attacks are not only aimed at creating new 
victims, but through retaliations, also new perpetrators, and can thus fuel a new wave of  chaos, unrest, 
and even more victims. They are even used as a way of  strengthening the world view of  the Islamic 
State by suggesting an apocalyptic situation. This is an example of  how the Islamic State can use their 
limited resources in an efficient way to get maximum effects of  their attacks.  
Lastly, some terror tactics of  the Islamic State are particularly shaped by the notion of  brutality in their 
intentions. These acts of  violence apply to a specific kind of  ‘symbolic’ violence such as beheadings of  
Sunnis, the immolation of  the Jordanian pilot, and the sexual slavery of  Yazidi women and girls. 
6.2.3. Propaganda and Recruitment 
To establish a caliphate, the Islamic State needs a large number of  people with different backgrounds 
and skills. Just recruiting soldiers is not enough to create a functioning society, other professions are 
also needed. The fact that Baghdadi shifted focus in the intentions of  the Islamic State can be 
understood as a strategic choice with regards to attracting as many people as possible. By moving away 
from ‘Mahdi the Savior’ towards more focus on the establishment of  a caliphate and the coming 
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apocalypse, the Islamic State could bring attention to several themes, such as brutality and utopianism, 
which made it possible for the Islamic State to target different kinds people, e.g., families, fighters, 
doctors, and other professionals. 
In contrast to the propaganda strategies of  Al Qaeda, who has relied on older internet platforms such 
as websites and online forums, the propaganda of  the Islamic State has been distributed on social 
media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, as well as through their own media channels, 
which has attracted younger people. Much of  the propaganda is also available in several languages. This 
is in line with their goals to create a caliphate: they need to reach a broader and larger audience.  
On the other hand, Al Qaeda’s propaganda is adapted to their intentions, i.e., targeting the Far Enemy 
and recruiting people to their cause of  defensive jihad, rather than building a caliphate. In contrast to 
the Islamic State, Al Qaeda can thus focus more on one kind of  propaganda, such as suicide missions 
or ‘martyrdom operations’ towards Western objects. Moreover, the propaganda strategy of  Al Qaeda 
reflects the elitism in Al Qaeda's intentions in how they seem themselves as an ‘elitist vanguard’ 
through inspiration. This means that senior Al Qaeda members can ‘afford’ to pontificate about jihad 
and quoting from the Qur’an in Arabic, rather than being active on social media and adapting their 
propaganda to a broader audience.   
6.2.4. Organization and Resources 
Starting from the formation of  the Islamic State, the merging of  Zarqawi’s group with Al Qaeda can be 
regarded as a strategic choice from both sides. From a strategic point of  view, the Al Qaeda brand was 
regarded as beneficial for Zarqawi’s own cause, since it could legitimize his terror operations. Likewise, 
the failed insurgencies of  Al Qaeda could be seen as a reason for why Al Qaeda accepted the merger 
with Zarqawi: they would have someone running an insurgency for them against their biggest enemy, 
and help them spread their ideology. In this regard, one could point out that both parties used the other 
as a means to an end.  
In the current state, the organizational structure of  the Islamic State reflects their intentions of  creating 
a caliphate. Compared to Al Qaeda, the Islamic State is more centralized, depends on a single leader to 
a greater degree, and is also geographically centralized. This is natural when one considers that the end 
goal is to run a society—something which is hard to do in a decentralized manner. In contrast, Al 
Qaeda, who are more focused on spreading Islamic ideas than on creating a caliphate, have a 
decentralized organization suited for long term survival and adaption. The fact that they have relied on 
both formal and informal collaborations with other groups thus reflect their intention of  spreading 
their ideas and reaching their goal of  gathering other jihadist groups under their ‘inspirational’ 
umbrella. In line with this is also to win the heart and minds of  local populations to support the visions 
of  Al Qaeda. The fact that the Al Qaeda Core communicates their learning to affiliates, for instance by 
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respecting local traditions (rather than imposing strict Sharia laws) thus reflect their intentions. This 
shows that the intentions of  an organization shape its strategy and even organizational structure. 
The territorial gains by the Islamic State in capturing large cities and strategic border crossings are a key 
aspect in understanding their strategies and organizational development. Besides being able to govern 
in line with their intentions, territorial gains have provided the organization with opportunities to 
expand further and thus conduct more terror campaigns, much due to the advantage in logistical 
support in training fighters, moving and withstanding more easily. Another aspect that has increased the 
opportunities for the Islamic State to continue and develop their strategies is the financial and 
technological advantages that seizing land have generated. By controlling and smuggling oil as well as 
taxing the local population, the Islamic State has been able to pay their fighters and give bonuses to 
families that move to the caliphate with their family. This has been a major advantage in comparison 
with Al Qaeda, who had to rely on bin Laden’s personal wealth, as well as on charity. 
While the Islamic State’s strategy of  acquiring territories has many benefits, it can also be problematic. 
While Al Qaeda has experienced territorial loss of  Afghanistan as a safe haven and operational base, 
they have managed to survive through its affiliates who operate in different parts of  Middle East and 
Africa. Although forced, the decentralization process in operations has proven to be strategically 
beneficial. In this regard, Al Qaeda has managed to survive both as an organization and at the same 
time to succeed with some of  its intentions: to gather the jihadist movement under their ‘inspirational 
umbrella’. In contrast, since much of  the Islamic States identity and success as a terror organization is 
tied to their territorial gains and with it, their wealth, the terrorism of  the Islamic State could fail—at 
least with regards to their goals. 
6.2.5. Summary 
In the above sections, the connection between the intentions and the strategy of  the Islamic State has 
been explored. Many examples have been used to show that the intentions, collective values, and goals 
of  an organization shape the other components of  its strategy. In the case of  the Islamic State, the 
strategy can to a large extent be explained with reference to the goal of  creating a caliphate in the near 
future. Since this is one of  the major differences between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda, many major 
differences in their respective strategies can also be derived from this difference.  
However, an organization is not, as the Instrumental Perspective assumes, a unit acting on completely 
shared values. It consists of  many individuals with their own needs, motivations, and agendas. To 
explore how this view can explain the strategy of  the Islamic State, the Organizational Perspective is 
used.  
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6.3. The Organizational Perspective 
According to the Organizational Perspective, things are not as ‘straightforward’ as in the Instrumental 
Perspective. Not everything can be derived from the collective values and goals that the members of  
the organization have. Instead, it is the individual members’ differences and group dynamics that result 
in terrorism. The members disagree over ends and means, have different motivations for participating 
in terrorism (including personal needs), and actions can often be explained with the incentives that 
leaders provide for followers. This perspective allows one to look at ways in which the organization 
behaves inconsistently, erratically, and unpredictably, without having to explain all actions in terms of  
strategic choices towards the fulfillment of  ends. In this section, the focus is on how the Islamic State 
has developed in terms of  these factors, and what influence Al Qaeda has had. 
6.3.1. Intentions 
The development of  the intentions of  the Islamic State can be explained as the internal dynamics 
within AQI, and the disagreement over ends and means between AQI and Al Qaeda. In this regard, the 
anti-Shia stance of  Zarqawi, and his methods of  publicly beheading his enemies are two such examples 
of  members of  an organization having different opinions on why and how to conduct terrorism, or in 
this case: differences between the parent organization and one of  its affiliates. Zarqawi's dissatisfaction 
with Al Qaeda’s intentions and his anti-Shia rhetoric can also be understood as a means of  him trying 
to ‘voice’ the intentions of  Al Qaeda, for instance with his wish to escalate violence. Besides having 
different views on who the real enemy is, the necessity of  a caliphate also became a central point in 
AQI/ISI’s intentions. This further distanced AQI from AQ with regards to intentions. 
Although Zarqawi never officially exited from Al Qaeda, the difference in means and ends between 
AQI and AQ would eventually lead to the development of  the Islamic State. Moreover, the Islamic 
State would not only support the visions of  Zarqawi, but further develop them in accordance with his 
sectarian views, both ideologically and politically.  
The development of  the Islamic States’ intentions would however eventually lead to an ‘exit’ from the 
parent organization. Moreover, the Islamic State’s reinforcement of  voice with regards to intentions, 
and their eventual exit, can also be understood as the result of  the group dynamics between members 
in AQI/ISI (and later also under the name the Islamic State), with regards to notions of  sectarianism, 
the caliphate and the apocalypse, which would dominate the intentions of  the Islamic State.  
However, the fact that Baghdadi shifted focus in Islamic States intentions to state building and the 
apocalypse can also be regarded as one example of  ensuring organizational survival. By connecting the 
past (historical) struggles in the Middle East with the present instability in Iraq and Syria, he could 
“operationalize the intentions,” i.e., transform the ideology and goals of  the organization into a 
different kind of  action than the one promulgated by Masri. Although not a major change in the 
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intentions of  the Islamic State, this shift to a focus on state building and the apocalypse would provide 
the Islamic State with new incentives to conduct terror campaigns, both with regards to tactics and 
propaganda.  
Overall, the Organizational Perspective captures aspects that the Instrumental Perspective overlooks, 
for instance the disagreements between different groups and individuals, and the role of  group 
dynamics in the development of  terrorist organizations.  
6.3.2. Warfare and Terror Attacks 
From an Organizational Perspective, the terror tactics and the military identity can be perceived as the 
result of  the internal group dynamics between the jihadist and Baathist sections of  the Islamic State. As 
already mentioned, their combined skill in waging war and running insurgencies has shaped the specific 
modus operandi of  the Islamic State and consequently their success: different kind of  attacks has had 
specific aims.  
According to the Organizational Perspective, one can change a group’s intentions because it benefits 
the survival of  the organization, and to incentivize the members, i.e., ‘operationalization of  ideology.’ 
When Baghdadi shifted focus to the apocalypse and state building, he made it possible to act with 
regards to capturing territory as well as killing minorities. This is an example of  how the warfare of  the 
Islamic State, and especially their brutality, can explained by organizational survival and incentives 
rather than as means to an end.  
Moreover, the Organizational Perspective also explains organizational survival relation to rivalry among 
groups, and escalation of  violence. The brutality used by the Islamic State in relation to their warfare 
and terror tactics can thus be understood as them competing with Al Qaeda. 
The military strategy and success of  the Islamic State is also an example how Baghdadi has improved 
and ‘promoted’ the Islamic State. From an organizational perspective, the success of  the Islamic State’s 
terror campaigns is thus tied to the personal ambitions of  Baghdadi.  
However, the Islamic State has not always been successful. From an Organizational Perspective, the 
organization has also appeared inconsistent, erratic and unpredictable in their terrorism (and terror 
actions). The leadership of  Masri, and the actions undertaken by AQI/ISI reflect this very well. One 
such example is the brutality towards not only civilians, but towards other jihadist groups as well, 
something which led to Bin Laden receiving a letter of  complaint about his Iraqi franchise.  
Again, the Organizational Perspective complements the Instrumental Perspective by explaining the 
actions of  the Islamic State using other factors, such as group dynamics, rivalry with other terrorist 
groups (especially Al Qaeda), incentives, and personal ambitions. It also shows that terrorist actions not 
always work towards the ends of  the group, but can also appear inconsistent and erratic.  
!45
6.3.3. Recruitment and Propaganda 
The fact that the Islamic State has been particularly successful in their propaganda and recruitment 
strategies relates to the incentives that Baghdadi has provided to different kinds of  potential recruits. 
Since the intentions of  the Islamic State is to establish and expand territory, attracting a wide range of  
people with different skills has been paramount for its success. 
By using different themes in the propaganda and recruitment, Baghdadi and his organization have been 
able to attract people who join for both personal as well as ideological reasons: both families as well as 
foreign fighters and professionals. For instance, by drawing on the necessity of  state building and the 
coming of  an apocalypse, Baghdadi and the Islamic State have been able to connect the past struggles 
with the present and thus making people feel like they are a part of  an important historical struggle. 
This is why the theme of  utopianism can be regarded as particularly effective in providing people with 
incentives to join, since it can appeal to a variety of  needs: both personal as well as ideological. Many 
people can find a reason to join the Islamic State, whether it is about help ‘building’ the state, working 
for it, or fighting for it, or simply improving one’s own life.  
According to the Organizational Perspective, terror organizations need to compete with each other, and 
this can be used to explain the way they portray themselves. In this regard, the extreme violence of  the 
Islamic State is also one aspect that has made them stand out with regards to rivals, which can provide 
an incentive for people to join them. The propaganda, and the style of  editing, is also something that 
makes the Islamic State stand out in relation to rivals: particularly in relation to the brutality that is 
portrayed.  
In contrast, the incentives provided by Al Qaeda with regards to propaganda and recruitment differs 
from the Islamic State in several aspects, with the two main things being the focus on elitism, and on 
jihad. From an organizational perspective, the elitism of  Al Qaeda in their propaganda and recruitment 
can however be regarded as a way of  ensuring the organizational survival: only the most devoted and 
well educated (on jihad) members are allowed to join. This also provides the potential members with 
personal motives, i.e., pride of  belonging to the elite, as an incentive to join.  
In relation to jihad, the incentive of  martyrdom or suicide missions can thus be regarded as the most 
important provided by Al Qaeda and their leader Zawahiri. Besides the fact that suicide missions are 
considered effective, the publicity it generates also provides recruits and members with motivation, 
especially since it makes Al Qaeda stand out in terms of  uncompromising religiousness. However, 
although the elitist strategy of  Al Qaeda might help in keeping unwelcome people away, the lack of  
variety when it comes to incentives can prove to be a problem in competition with the Islamic State.  
Compared to the Organizational Perspective, the Instrumental Perspective lacks two important aspects 
in explaining propaganda and recruitment of  terror organizations. First, people join terror 
organizations not only due to ideological motives, but also because of  personal needs. Second, the 
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propaganda is designed not just to spread the organization’s ideas, but also to compete with other terror 
organizations.  
6.3.4. Organization and Resources 
The development of  the Islamic State as an organization can be understood as the result of  group 
dynamics of  two sorts: external and internal. The external group dynamics are between the Islamic 
State’s predecessor and parent organization: Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda. In this regard, group 
dynamics are for instance manifested by the fact that Zarqawi managed to persuade Bin Laden to 
provide him with seed money, despite the doubts Bin Laden and Zawahiri had regarding Zarqawi. 
Without the money provided by Bin Laden, and later the Al Qaeda brand, it would probably have been 
more difficult for Zarqawi to establish his own terror organization, and later merge with Al Qaeda. 
From an organizational perspective, the Al Qaeda label can also be understood as an incentive in its 
own right for Al Qaeda to use, and for Zawahiri to attract followers to Al Qaeda in Iraq.  
Where external groups dynamics is what started Al Qaeda in Iraq, the evolution from AQI to the 
Islamic State has been characterized by internal group dynamics. In this regard, Baghdadi has been 
successful in tying his own personal ambitions to the survival of  the group by providing different 
incentives for the leadership within the Islamic State. The process of  “Iraqisation” can be seen as one 
such example, where senior leadership positions were given to Iraqis who Baghdadi personally knew 
and trusted, and who knew the ways of  Iraqi people, in contrast to AQI/ISI and the core around 
Masri. By replacing and purging the previous leadership, Baghdadi also eliminated future disagreements 
over ends and means within the Islamic State and could further strengthen his own ambitions as the 
leader of  the Islamic State.  
According to the Organizational Perspective, achieving the long-term goals of  the organization is not 
the only thing that matters—in some sense, the survival of  the organization is more important. 
Organizational survival can also be related to the incentives in Baghdadi and the Islamic State’s tribal 
policy, which provided some of  the Sunni tribes with both carrots as well as sticks. Masri and ISI were 
too brutal, and sometimes erratic and unpredictable in their terrorist actions, making people stop 
cooperating with them. Baghdadi, on the other hand, used a combination of  incentives and making the 
tribes complicit in the terror operations, which made it difficult for them not to cooperate with the 
Islamic State. In this regard, the evaluation of  previous strategies in the form of  the Strategic Plan has 
also been important for the survival of  the Islamic State. It can therefore be understood as a means of  
ensuring organizational survival.  
The ambitions of  Baghdadi and his demands for extreme loyalty can however prove to be unfavorable 
for the long term organizational survival of  the Islamic State. Where organizational purging and 
replacement has helped AQI/ISI evolve to the Islamic State, the fact remains that the very authoritarian 
structure also prevents outlets of  dissatisfaction, both with regards to voice and exit.  
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The organizational development of  Al Qaeda can also be understood in relation to maintaining 
organizational survival, albeit somewhat differently. Although the highest level of  the organizational 
structure is maintained in some respects, the fact that Al Qaeda evaluate their operations and core 
operatives are allowed to criticize leaders, can be regarded as a sign of  sensitivity to members, as 
suggested by Crenshaw (1988: 22). Another example of  organizational survival is how Al Qaeda 
evaluate successes and failures which are further transmitted to their affiliates, for instance with regards 
to local grievances and sensibilities. In this regard, the organizational survival of  Al Qaeda happens on 
several levels: both within the core as well as outside in relation to their affiliates.  
Affiliations, which Al Qaeda make use of  to a larger extent than ISIS, can be understood in relation to 
two kinds of  organizational survival: 1) as an ‘evolutionary’ response to government and counter 
terrorism policies, and, 2) as innovative responses to ‘exit’. The increase in the more formalized 
relationship after 9/11 and the US-invasion of  Afghanistan is would be an example of  the first kind of  
organizational survival in which the Al Qaeda label on insurgent groups was deemed necessary, for 
both the Al Qaeda core, but also as a response to those targeting them. The more formalized affiliation 
can thus be understood as a way for Al Qaeda to remain active as a potent brand.  
An example of  the second kind of  organizational survival is the focus on strategic command and 
control (rather than day-to day oversight), and the appointment of  a global deputy leader in strategic 
zones. This can be regarded as ‘innovative responses’ in several ways: on the one hand, the affiliates will 
have enough say in running their ‘own’ insurgency, and on the other, Al Qaeda have found several ways 
of  ‘curbing’ decentralization and thus preventing ‘voice’ or dissatisfaction.  
However, the fact that Al Qaeda, since its beginning has used centralization and decentralization 
simultaneously, is an example of  how they maintain their survival in relation to the leadership of  Bin 
Laden (and later Zawahiri): by supporting local insurgent groups with money, logistics, training, and 
their cause in relation to Al Qaeda’s, Bin Laden could make sure that Al Qaeda grew as a global 
terrorist organization. In this regard, the sometimes fluid organizational structure has made Al Qaeda 
durable. Time will tell if  the centralized structure of  the Islamic State can survive in the long run, or if  
they too need to decentralize in order to survive.  
According the Organizational Perspective, an organization is not just formed for the fulfillment of  the 
goals, but also due to personal ambitions and agendas, internal group dynamics, and disagreements over 
means and ends. The survival of  the group is as important as reaching the goals, and as can be seen in 
the examples above, it has been an important factor to consider when studying the development of  the 
Islamic State in relation to Al Qaeda. In the next chapter, Conclusion, the results of  the analysis from 
both the Instrumental as well as the Organizational Perspective are discussed.  
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7. Conclusion 
The aim of  this thesis has been to study the strategy of  the Islamic State in relation to the strategy of  
Al Qaeda. Furthermore, this have been done with Martha Crenshaw’s Instrumental and Organizational 
Perspectives. In this thesis, different components of  both the Islamic State’s and Al Qaeda’s strategy 
have been examined, and analyzed with the help of  the Instrumental and Organizational Perspectives. 
One of  the main conclusions of  this thesis is that the development of  the strategy of  the Islamic State 
has been closely tied to Al Qaeda. To truly understand the Islamic State, one needs to study Al Qaeda. 
This is true, independently of  which perspective one assumes, the Islamic State has been strongly 
influenced by Al Qaeda, both instrumentally and organizationally.  
According to the Instrumental Perspective, intentions and ideology shape the strategy of  a terrorist 
organization. Since Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have different intentions and values, their strategies 
are different. Al Qaeda, for instance, has been more focused on spreading their ideas in fighting the Far 
Enemy (the US), and supporting local jihadist groups under Al Qaeda’s inspirational banner of  global 
Jihad. On the other hand, the main goal of  the Islamic State has been to establish a caliphate, and rule 
through brutality. Thus, the intentions of  each organization have come to shape different sections of  
their strategy differently.  
The warfare and terror tactics of  the Islamic State have, for instance, been about fighting local and 
regional enemies such as the Iraqi and Syrian government, and targeting minorities such as the Shi’a 
and Yazidis. In contrast, Al Qaeda’s global approach in fighting the Far Enemy, have resulted in 
attritional terror campaigns towards symbolically important targets, and providing the affiliates with 
training, and strategical support. Since the strategy of  the Islamic State is land based, and has a focus 
on the creation of  a caliphate, this requires different kinds of  people with a variety of  skills, and thus, 
their recruitment and propaganda strategy has been more diversified and adapted to a larger audience. 
In contrast, the recruitment and propaganda strategy of  Al Qaeda has been more elitist, with more 
focus on targeting the Far Enemy, through methods of  attrition (such as suicide bombings).  
The territorial gains made by the Islamic State have also resulted in a highly centralized and hierarchical 
organizational structure. Moreover, these gains have also led to resources such as oil, and money from 
taxing local populations. While Al Qaeda also favors a hierarchical structure within the Al Qaeda Core, 
they rely more on a mix of  centralized and decentralized organizational structures, in line with their 
intentions.  
According to the Organizational Perspective, group dynamics and individual members are as important 
as intentions in explaining the behavior of  terrorist organizations. The fact that the AQI/ISI has 
evolved towards the Islamic State is one example of  the internal dynamics between the founder of  AQI 
(Zarqawi), and the Al Qaeda Core (Bin Laden/Zawahiri), having disagreements over ends and means. 
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Moreover, personal agendas within the leadership of  AQI/ISI have resulted in their warfare and terror 
tactics being erratic, unpredictable, and inconsistent. The success of  the Islamic State’s recruitment and 
propaganda strategies has been defined by the fact that Baghdadi has provided members and potential 
recruits with different incentives, both personal as well as ideological. In this regard, the brutality of  the 
Islamic State’s intentions and terror tactics have also been important in recruiting members as well as 
competing with other groups such as Al Qaeda. Although the creation of  the Islamic State can be 
understood as disagreements over ends and means between AQI and Al Qaeda Core, the survival of  
the Islamic State from ISI is an example of  the personal ambitions of  leaders in maintaining 
organizational survival. One such example is how Baghdadi came to purge and replace leadership 
positions. In the case of  Al Qaeda, organizational survival is best explained by their formalized 
affiliations.  
As stated, understanding the development of  the strategy of  the Islamic State depends on 
understanding Al Qaeda. Another key conclusion is that the two different perspectives are both needed 
and complement each other. While the Instrumental Perspective allows one to understand the logic and 
rationale behind the Islamic State’s strategy, things are sometimes more complex than it suggests, and 
can be better understand through the lens of  the Organizational Perspective, which emphasizes the 
individual members and group dynamics.  
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